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ENDING PARENTS’ UNLIMITED POWER TO CHOOSE: 
LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY TO PROHIBIT PARENTS’ 
SELECTION OF THEIR CHILDREN’S SEX AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“We’ll take a blond haired, brown eyed girl, who will reach a height of 
5’8” with musical talent, athletic prowess, and an IQ of 145,” requested Steve 
and Kristie Robinson.  The couple already had a healthy, adorable four-year 
old son who exhibited intellectual aptitude and amazing physical capabilities, 
and the couple now wanted a baby daughter who would exceed her peers in 
every facet of life.  While at first glance it may appear these parents only want 
the same things all parents want for their children—the “best” life possible—
parents’ power to select the sex or other characteristics of their offspring may 
render harmful moral, social, and biological consequences.1 
Parents have had the ability to decide when they want to have children, 
how many children they want to have, and how these children will be 
conceived.  Subsequent to advances in reproductive technology in 2001, 
parents now have another option—to select the sex of their children prior to 
conception.2  Further innovations in technology may soon allow parents to give 
their children a tool for becoming the “best” of which their parents never 
dreamed—the ideal genes.3  In light of the impact of procreation not only to 
 
 1. See Girls Discriminated Against before Birth, Childrens Special Session Preparatory 
Committee Told, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 2, 2001, at 2001 WL 4183506.  In a follow up meeting of 
the United Nations 1990 World Summit for Children, a panel expressed concern about the 
discrimination against females in certain parts of the world, especially in Asian countries, and the 
likelihood that emerging reproductive technologies would result in an expansion of 
discrimination against female children.  Id. 
 2. Frederic Golden, Boy? Girl? Up to You, TIME.COM, Sept. 21, 1998, at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/1998/dom/980921/medicine.boy_girl_up_to17a.html (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2002) (reporting that a fertility center in Virginia can now offer an 85% chance 
of ensuring couples that they will have a girl); Sarah Boseley, Boy or Girl? Just Sort the Sperm: 
Boy or Girl? Let Machine Sort the Sperm, THE GUARDIAN (Manchester, UK), July 1, 2001, at 1.1 
(reporting that English couples are likely to travel to Virginia to utilize a sperm-sorting machine 
at a Virginia reproductive clinic which permits parents to select the sex of their child with 92% 
accuracy for girls and 72% accuracy for boys).  See also infra notes 16-26 and accompanying 
text. 
 3. Legal institutions have yet to deal with parents’ relentless search to use reproductive 
technologies to create the “best” offspring.  The most striking example of how far some 
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oneself, but also on one’s children, others in the present environment, and 
humans who will live centuries into the future, the rights related to procreation 
should be considered with respect to their potentially broad impact.4 
Legislation is needed to prohibit parents’ ability to use reproductive 
technologies to select the sex and traits of their children prior to conception.5  
Section I of this Comment addresses the concerns associated with the selection 
of traits and characteristics, methods of sex selection which are currently 
available and the history and culture related to sex selection.  Section II 
discusses the constitutional decisions involving an individual’s choices 
concerning family, conception and child rearing, and the manner in which 
these cases implicate certain legal issues in relation to the regulation of 
preconception selection of offspring sex and characteristics.  In addition, the 
potential harms associated with the use of these reproductive technologies will 
be discussed to show that these tribulations meet the legitimate state interests 
necessary for legislation to be upheld.  Section III proposes that because the 
use of these reproductive techniques should not be considered a fundamental 
right of parents nor a matter protected within the realm of personal privacy, the 
Supreme Court is likely to uphold legislation in this area.  Finally, Section IV 
discusses the legislative measures enacted in other nations and emphasizes the 
need for the United States to regulate reproductive technologies that permit 
preconception sex and trait selection. 
 
prospective parents go to fulfill their desire for a genetically perfect child is the internet site at 
which female and male models auction their sperm and eggs.  Rons’ Angels, at 
http://ronsangels.com/index2.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).  “The prices for gametes on sale at 
ronsangels.com begin at $15,000 for sperm and egg donations and go as high as $150,000 for an 
egg donation from a buxom, blond, blue-eyed ‘pop artist’ and ‘international model.’”  Vida 
Foubister, Reproductive Technologies Outpacing Ethical Concerns, AMEDNEWS.COM, Jan. 17, 
2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amneww/pick_00?prsb0117.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 
2002). 
 4. See Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology: A Regulatory 
Framework for Trait Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 188 (1993) (noting that as 
technology affords individuals, particularly women, heightened powers to influence the genetic 
makeup of children, novel questions arise regarding the far-reaching implications for the social 
order); Marian D. Damewood, Ethical Implications of a New Application of Preimplantation 
Diagnosis, 285 JAMA 3143, 3144 (2001) (arguing that the prevention of transmitting sex-linked 
diseases is the only reason strong enough to override the concerns regarding sex selection).  See 
also Chrisian Byk, The Ethical and Legal Sense of Medically Assisted Procreation, in THE 
ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 277 (Hille Haker & Deryck Beylevald eds., 
2000) (indicating that procreation “is a manifestation of our culture, our identity, our 
individuality, relations we establish with others, and the perception that we have of our future and 
the future of our descendants”). 
 5. Legislation will be needed as these technologies rapidly become available to the public. 
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A. Harmful Consequences of Parents’ Selection of the Sex and Traits of their 
Children 
One concern of gender manipulation is that parents will use prebirth 
genetic manipulation to give their offspring genes for intelligence, physical 
attractiveness, and other positive characteristics, because it will enhance their 
children’s opportunities in life without considering the far-reaching effects of 
their decision.6  Since parents naturally hope for their children to be successful 
in life and exemplify a certain image, parents try to provide their children with 
the tools to fulfill their hopes.7  However, despite the resources parents provide 
to their offspring to enhance the children’s success, children’s potential is 
limited by their genetic composition and abilities. 
Under typical circumstances, babies begin their lives with a unique set of 
characteristics resulting from a random blending of their parents’ genes.8  
Instead of this natural random combination of parents’ genes, parents may 
soon be able to select the genetic makeup of their children.9  The ability to 
select children’s genes—which are thought by some to be the primary 
determinants of health, longevity, and success—will give parents the power to 
give their offspring certain characteristics according to their personal 
preferences.10  Sex selection technology fulfills parents quest for the perfect 
 
 6. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 
436 (1996) (concluding that procreative liberty leaves parents with a fair amount of discretion 
over who they want their offspring to be). 
 7. Multiple books, articles, and tools exist which provide parents with suggestions for 
successful child-rearing strategies.  See generally http://www.ridgeviewmedical.org/services/ 
childcare/newsletter/learning.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (discussing the types of behavior 
parents should exhibit during the first twelve months of a baby’s life to enhance the baby’s 
socialization and learning); WILLIAM SEARS & MARTHA SEARS, THE BABY BOOK: EVERYTHING 
YOU’LL NEED TO KNOW ABOUT YOUR BABY FROM BIRTH TO AGE TWO (1st ed. 1993) 
(discussing actions parents can take to benefit their babies at various stages of babies’ 
development). 
 8. See http://www.ridgeviewmedical.org/services/childcare/newsletter/learning.asp (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2001). 
 9. See Steven Wheatley, Human Rights and Human Dignity in the Resolution of Certain 
Ethical Questions in Biomedicine, 3 EUR. HEALTH L. REV. 312, 318 (2001). 
 10. See Robertson supra note 6, at 421 “The human genome project—the international effort 
to map and sequence the entire human genome—is a major contributor to genetic consciousness, 
and will continue to produce genetic discoveries for years to come.”  Id.  Robertson weighs 
parents’ interests in procreative freedom and the unprecedented control that parents could have 
over the lives of their offspring.  Id. at 421-24.  Ultimately, Robertson contends that the 
procreative rights involved justify only limited interference.  Id. at 479-82.  See also Kingsley R. 
Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and 
the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 1038 (1995).  According to Browne, the field of 
behavioral genetics offers evidence of a biological basis for traits.  Id.  Two avenues which 
evidence the influence of genes on human behavior are studies of twins and adopted children.  Id.  
For instance, the fact that biological siblings who are raised separately from one another tend to 
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child, with parents’ expectations and fantasies of what the child will be.11  The 
wake of reproductive technological advances foreshadows a world populated 
with “designer” offspring whose every characteristic may be carefully selected 
and produced.12 
Some bioethicists express concern that sex selection will “turn children 
into something ‘we make to order, like an object of our choice, a 
commodity.’”13  United States culture tends to equate genetic alterations with 
“playing God.”14  By equating genes with destiny, some believe that any 
attempt to alter the genes of humans is an attempt to alter the destiny of the 
human race itself.15 
B. Current Reproduction Technology Techniquest for Preconception Sex 
Selection 
The two most commonly used methods of sex selection, amniocentisis and 
chorion villus biopsy, permit sex selection by terminating a pregnancy between 
eight and twenty weeks into the pregnancy.16  Most people are disgusted with 
 
exhibit more similarities to one another than unrelated children who are reared together supports 
the proposition that human traits are influenced by genes to a greater degree than by environment.  
Id.  See generally ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 19-40 (1985) (explaining the way 
humans evolved through natural selection to inherit the genes that are beneficial to human’s 
survival and reproduction); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976). 
 11. See Marilyn H. Karfeld, Selecting a Baby’s Gender Raises Ethical Problems, 
CLEVELAND JEWISH NEWS, Sept. 25, 1998, at 18 (indicating that Judaism sees as a virtue the 
procreation of all children, girls and boys, healthy and unhealthy, such that Judaism would frown 
upon wholesale, widespread sex selection because it reduces the overall uniqueness of the child). 
 12. Jodi Danis, Sexism and “The Superfluous Female”: Arguments for Regulating Pre-
implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 219 (1995).  See also Wheatley, supra note 
9, at 318 (noting there is nothing novel about parents’ desire to have children of a certain sex or 
with certain characteristics, but until very recently, parents did not have the ability to “design” 
their prospective children); Damewood, supra note 4, at 24 (warning that the selection of sex and 
desirable physical attributes of children through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis may be the 
precursor to designer genes). 
 13. Karfeld, supra note 11, at 19-20. 
 14. SUSANNA HORNIG PRIEST, A GRAIN OF TRUTH: THE MEDIA, THE PUBLIC, AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 77 (2001). 
 15. See id.  See also John B. Attanasio, Science Tests Human Dignity: The Challenges of 
Genetic Engineering, 53 SMU L. REV. 455, 458-59 (2000) (discussing a hypothetical in which 
the amazing results achieved in experiments aimed at increasing babies’ intelligence by injecting 
a new drug into eggs prior to in-vitro fertilization and the constitutional implications of this 
research). 
 16. M.C. Macnaughton, Prenatal Sex Selection, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND THE LAW 
47 (A. Allan Templeton & Douglas J. Cusine eds., 1990) (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of these methods of sex selection).  See also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Privacy and 
the Regulation of the Technologies: A Decision-Making Approach, 22 FAM. L.Q. 173, 194 (1988) 
(indicating that other methods of reproductive genetic manipulation include alteration of the fetus 
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the notion of aborting a fetus based on the unborn child’s sex, but recent 
technological innovations do not even require the production of an embryo for 
sex selection to occur. 17  When couples undergo in vitro fertilization, eggs and 
sperm combine in a lab dish to create an embryo and specialists can tell with 
almost 100 percent accuracy which embryos are male or female by genetically 
testing a single cell.18  “Fertility clinics long have used this technique to help 
couples at high risk of bearing children with gender-linked genetic diseases to 
pick which embryo to have implanted.”19 
A very recent advance in reproductive technology provides parents with an 
accurate method of selecting the sex of their children prior to conception.20  
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and sperm sorting through flow 
cytometry are two innovative reproductive methods, which offer parents the 
chance to select the sex of their progeny.21  Scientists at a fertility clinic in 
Fairfax, Virginia, announced in May 2001 that they developed a sperm-
separation method, which will allow parents to choose the sex of their child.22  
Sperm carrying the Y-chromosomes, which create male offspring, contains two 
and a half percent less DNA than X-chromosomes, which create female 
offspring.23  By separating and removing sperm more likely to produce boys or 
 
using in utero fetal therapy and that the future may bring gene substitution and modification, 
pathogenesis, and cloning). 
 17. See Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted 
Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 330-33 (1991) 
(summarizing a review of reports, bills, and legislation from around the world from 1987-1999 to 
indicate that a general world consensus indicates that “neither sex selection of embryos, except 
for sex-linked diseases, nor eugenic selection should be allowed”). 
 18. Picking Baby’s Sex Gets Support, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at A24 (announcing the 
statement of a fertility clinic ethics chairman that it is ethical for parents to select the sex of their 
offspring). 
 19. Id.  “Critics long have considered gender selection for non-medical reasons as a form of 
sex discrimination and the start as a slippery slope toward choosing children on the basis of other 
traits.”  Id. 
 20. See Rachel E. Remaley, “The Original Sexist Sin”: Regulating Preconception Sex 
Selection Technology, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 252-53 (2000) (explaining the uses in the rapidly 
emerging reproductive technology in the forms of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and sperm-
sorting, both of which permit parents to select or avoid certain features in their offspring).  See 
also John O’Farrell, Secrets of the Sperm Machine, THE GUARDIAN, July 7, 2001, available at 
2001 WL 24302449, at *1 (indicating that a clinic is charging $2,000 for couples to use the 
“sperm sorting machine” to choose the sex of their child). 
 21. Remaley, supra note 20, at 253-54 (noting that prospective parents who use in vitro 
fertilization are more likely to have a child of the desired sex than parents who use innovative 
sperm sorting techniques). 
 22. See Karfeld, supra note 11.  Once the sperm are sorted, pregnancy is achieved through 
artificial insemination.  Id. 
 23. Id.  This method is “remarkably accurate.”  Id.  “Using this technology for parents who 
wanted girls, 10 out of 11 babies born were female.”  Id.  The rate of success is slightly lower for 
boys.  Id. 
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girls and then using the preferred sperm for artificial insemination, this 
technology allows parents to choose the sex of their offspring with remarkable 
accuracy.24 
Sperm-separation techniques are the most reliable method available of sex 
selection currently available, with estimates of an eighty-six percent success 
rate.25  In May 2001, the chairman of the American Medical Association ethics 
group published a policy saying that, under certain conditions, doctors could 
offer preconception sex selection services to families who already have 
children and now want another baby of the opposite gender.26 
C. The History of Sex Selection Indicates that Parents Will Use Reproductive 
Technologies to Select their Children’s Sex and Traits 
Considering the historical use of sex selection methods, parents will take 
advantage of innovative reproductive technologies to select the sex and traits 
of their children.  For centuries, parents practiced various techniques to ensure 
that their progeny would be of a certain sex, usually male.  Even in ancient 
times, people attempt to control the sex of their offspring.  Old wives’ tales 
claimed that by tying the left testicle or by having the husband lie on a certain 
side of the bed ensured the birth of a male offspring.27  Parents attempted to 
copulate on certain dates, believing this would ensure the birth of a child of a 
certain sex.28  In the Talmud, Jewish rabbis instruct men in methods to ensure 
the birth of male children.29  The Greek physician Hippocrates advised parents 
that if a daughter was desired the man “should tie off the right testicle as much 
as he can bear it;” if a son was desired, the man “should have relations with his 
 
 24. See Picking Baby’s Sex, supra note 18, at A24.  At this early stage in the technology, the 
success rates are higher for female offspring than for male offspring.  Id. 
 25. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 139 (1995) (indicating that at least seventy clinics in 
the United States used variations of the sperm separation procedure to select sex chromosome-
specific sperm). 
 26. Picking Baby’s Sex, supra note 18, at A24 (indicating that this is only the opinion of the 
committee’s chairman and the committee’s position discouraging sex selection stands until the 
committee reaches an updated conclusion). 
 27. See also Choosing Your Baby’s Sex: The Folk Wisdom, at 
http://www.womencentral.msn.com/babies/articles/preconception.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) 
(offering the following methods to conceive a baby of the desired sex: eating vegetables and 
chocolate, having sex in the missionary position and dancing the “baby dance” when the moon is 
full to conceive a female child; eating red meat, cola, and salty snacks, having sex when there is a 
quarter moon in the sky and making love standing up to conceive a male child). 
 28. The Selnas method is one of natural selection of the gender of mammal babies based on 
the alternating polarity cycle in the ovum membrane, which selects the sperm containing the X or 
the Y chromosome.  See http://www.babygenderselection.com/scientific_review.html. (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2001) 
 29. See Karfeld, supra note 11 (explaining that parents have historically been interested in 
selecting the sex of their offspring). 
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wife at the end of her period and should thrust as hard as he can until 
ejaculation.”30  Other methods over the centuries included high potassium and 
sodium diets and turning the nuptial bed to face the north wind, and precise 
timing of intercourse.31  Pro-Care Industries manufactured a “child-selection 
kit” in 1986, which was sold for $49.95, which purported to allow parents to 
monitor vaginal mucus to select the sex of their offspring.32 
Some parents take extreme measures to assure the birth of a child of the 
preferred sex.  Parents’ practice of infanticide to secure their offspring’s 
gender is a common phenomenon in many cultures.33  In an investigation of 
two hospitals in India that used abortion as a method of selecting the birth of 
male children, the study found that at one hospital in 1976-1977, almost 
twenty-five percent of the women admitted wanted to know the sex of their 
fetus so they could abort it if the fetus was female.34 
In the United States, some couples will abort a fetus after genetic testing 
determines the fetus is of the undesired sex.35  Some measures of ensuring the 
birth of a child of the “right” sex are less drastic, but still suggest that parents 
are likely to use this technology if available.  There is a growing belief among 
individuals, geneticists and physicians that people are entitled to sex selection 
if they request it.36  In a survey of genetic clinic patients, sixty percent of those 
surveyed believed they had a right to referrals for any service they could pay 
 
 30. ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNING BABIES: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 163 (1999). 
 31. Id. at 164.  In ancient Egypt, the methods for predicting the sex of children was to 
sprinkle the urine of a woman on a few grains of barley and emmer.  Id.  If both sprouted, the 
woman was pregnant.  Id.  If only barley sprouted, the child was male; if only emmer sprouted, 
the child was female.  Id. 
 32. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 25, at 139 (noting that the product was shortly taken 
off the market when the Federal Drug Administration reported that some of the product’s claims 
were unsupported). 
 33. Id. at 138. 
 34. A. Ramanamma & Usha Bambawale, The Mania for Sons: An Analysis of Social Values 
in South Asia, 14B SOC. SCI. & MED. 107, 108 (1980).  The study revealed that of the 700 
pregnant women who visited the hospital during the year of the study, 430 of the 450 women that 
carried female fetuses aborted their fetuses.  Id. 
 35. See Karfeld, supra note 11.  The number of parents who abort children of the undesired 
sex is difficult to determine because most parents do not admit that they abort a fetus because 
they desire a child of the other sex.  Id. 
 36. Dorothy C. Wertz, Patients’ and Professionals’ Views on Autonomy, Disability, and 
“Discrimination”: Results of a 36-Nation Survey, in THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC 
RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 171, 173 (Timothy A. Caulfield & Bryn 
Williams-Jones eds., 1999).  But see Mark I. Evans, et al., Attitudes on the Ethics of Abortion, Sex 
Selection, and Selective Pregnancy Termination Among Health Care Professionals, Ethicists, and 
Clergy Likely to Encounter Such Situations, 164 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1098 (1991) 
(reporting findings on an empirical study indicating that the attitudes of health care providers is 
that sex-selective abortions are unethical). 
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for, including sex selection.37  Given this history of parents’ utilization of 
techniques to enhance the possibility of the birth of a child with a certain sex, it 
is likely that parents will take advantage of technology allowing them to select 
the sex and other characteristics of their offspring as this technology becomes 
available.38  As the number of children in American families decreases, 
couples will be more likely to utilize technologies for controlling the 
characteristics of their children.39 
Many prenatal diagnostic technologies are currently being used in the 
United States to reduce the incidence of birth defects, especially for women at 
risk of producing abnormal offspring.40  The problem arises as to where the 
 
 37. See Wertz, supra note 36, at 173 (noting the emphasis on autonomy displayed by 
patients in the United States). 
 38. See J.M. Berkowitz, Two Boys and a Girl Please and Hold the Mustard, 114 PUBLIC 
HEALTH 5, 5 (2000) (noting that the desire to select the sex of one’s children has remained strong 
since at least the time of Hippocrates, so it is likely that parents will utilize this technology when 
it becomes available). 
 39. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 25, at 138 (indicating that this trend is already present 
among families in the United States). 
 40. Id. at 134.  Parents attempt to avoid the birth of a child with sickle-cell anemia through 
the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis.  Id.  Although the first pregnancy achieved by 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis to avoid the transmission of a sex-linked disorder occurred 
nearly a decade ago, the first unaffected pregnancy using preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
occurred in 1997.  Id.  See Kangpu Xu et al., First Unaffected Pregnancy Using Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis for Sickle Cell Anemia, 281 JAMA 1701, 1706 (1999) (concluding that the 
study’s first unaffected pregnancy resulting from preimplantation genetic diagnosis for sickle cell 
anemia demonstrates that the technique can be a powerful diagnostic tool for carrier couples who 
desire a healthy child but wish to avoid the difficult decision of whether to abort an affected 
fetus); Lindsey Tanner, Gene-Screening Cases Raises Doubts, STAR-LEDGER (Newark N.J.), Feb. 
27, 2002, at 8 (discussing the usefulness of preimplantation genetic selection to avoid having a 
child with early-onset Alzheimer’s).  Preimplantation genetic diagnosis is an unregulated, market-
driven area of science, with some clinics already using the test for gender selection and others 
willing to test for whatever is scientifically feasible.  Some parents use sex selection methods to 
avoid giving birth to a child with a sex-linked genetic diseases.  However, such sex-linked 
diseases are rare, and most people use sex determination for other reasons.  Sex selection for 
medical purposes is a distinct phenomenon from sex selection for personal or cultural reasons.  
Many believe that determining a child’s sex prior to birth is unconditionally justified if there are 
reasons to presume the child will be born with an incurable pathology, but would be unethical if 
such selection methods were used only for social reasons.  See Macnaughton, supra note 16, at 50 
(indicating that most people agree the use of sex selection to avoid sex-linked diseases is 
justifiable on medical grounds).  See also Damewood, supra note 5 (reviewing various arguments 
for sex selection from a physician’s point of view and concluding that avoidance of sex-linked 
genetic disease is the only justification strong enough for the use of sex selection technology); 
A.Y. Ivanyushkin, New Reproductive Technologies in Russia, in CREATING THE CHILD 273 
(Donald Evans ed., 1996); Gian Carlo Di Renzo et al., Control of Human Reproduction, in 
CREATING THE CHILD 41 (Donald Evans ed., 1996) (discussing the current technologies which 
will permit humans growing control over the physical characteristics of their descendants); 139 
CONG. REC. S4716 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (indicating that 195,000 
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line should be drawn between what constitutes a disorder, which is serious 
enough to warrant selecting a child of the other sex.41  Because the issues 
involved in the use of reproductive technologies to select offspring 
characteristics for medical reasons is distinguishable from the use of these 
methods to select the sex and characteristics for personal reasons, medical 
selection of offspring characteristics will not be addressed in this Comment. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. A Deferential Rational Review Analysis Applies to Preconception Sex and 
Trait Selection Because a Fundamental Right Is Not Implicated in 
Parents’ Decisions to Use Reproductive Technologies for the Purpose of 
Sex and Trait Selection 
The traditional due process analysis involves a consideration of when a 
regulation impinges on a fundamental right.  The first step entails determining 
whether a right is, in fact, fundamental.42  Where certain fundamental rights are 
involved, the Supreme Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may 
be justified only by a “compelling state interest” and that legislative 
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest 
at stake.43 
 
abortions follow prenatal testing for genetic defects each year).  Because of the distinct issues 
presented, sex selection for therapeutic reasons will not be discussed in detail in this Comment. 
 41. See D. Morgan, Legal and Ethical Dilemmas of Fetal Sex Identification and Gender 
Selection, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND THE LAW 53, 66 (A. Allan Templeton & Douglas J. 
Cusine eds., 1990). 
 42. If the Court determines that a fundamental right is implicated, the Court must rigorously 
scrutinize the government interests in regulating the area to determine whether the government 
interests are substantial and whether the regulation is the only practical means of furthering those 
state interests.  See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin 
statute denying marriage licenses to any Wisconsin resident who is under an obligation to support 
a child not in the person’s custody and is unable to demonstrate compliance with the order to pay 
child support and that the child is not likely to become a charge of the state). 
 43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) (holding that to be fair, reasonable and an appropriate use of a state’s police power, an act 
must have a direct means-end relationship with an appropriate and legitimate state objective); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (striking down as unconstitutional a Nebraska 
law which prohibits the teaching of any subject in any language other than the English language 
in schools below the eighth grade; the law could not be sustained because it bore no reasonable 
relation to any end within the competency of the state, and deprives teachers and parents of 
liberty without due process of law).  The state may not interfere with the liberty interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause by legislative actions, which are arbitrary, or without 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.  Id. 
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When a fundamental right is not implicated, the Court will analyze the 
statute using the highly deferential rational basis standard of review.44  The test 
used by the Court considers whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.45  Courts almost always uphold the challenged legislation 
when the rational basis review applies.46   
This Comment proposes that parents’ right to select the sex and traits of 
their children should not be deemed a fundamental right under the 
constitutionally protected right of personal privacy.  This section will 
demonstrate that the use of reproductive technologies to select the sex and 
traits of one’s offspring does not implicate the same guarantees of personal 
privacy and autonomy implicit in the Supreme Court decisions relating to 
pregnancy, abortion, children and family. Given this, the legitimate 
government interest in preventing the harmful effects of the use of this 
reproductive technology should allow a ban to pass the rational basis test.47  
Therefore, state regulations in this area of reproductive technology will be 
upheld by a mere showing that the state has a rational basis for the law.48 
 
 44. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955) (The rational 
basis standard of review is applied to most social and economic regulations.).  See also 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (holding that loss of liberty by confinement for 
mental illness called for showing that the individual suffers from a condition more serious than 
idiosyncratic behavior; reasonable doubt standard is inappropriate in civil proceedings attempting 
to deprive a citizen of the substantial right of freedom from confinement).  The Court has stated 
that when considering individual rights, the standard of proof, at a minimum, reflects the value 
society places on individual liberty.  Id.  However, this is not the circumstance when considering 
preconception sex and trait selection. 
 45. The burden is on the challenger of the regulation. 
 46. See United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (refusing to continue 
analyzing a federal statute after determining that the rational basis review applied).  See also 
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  Even if preconception 
sex and trait selection were considered an exercise of an individual’s fundamental personal liberty 
interest, the magnitude of the state interests in preventing the harms associated with the use of 
these techniques outweighs the individual rights implicated, such that a ban on preconception sex 
selection procedures would have to pass a strict scrutiny test under the Constitution. 
 47. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (noting that a regulation to which strict scrutiny applies can 
survive only if it furthers a compelling state interest, such as health). 
 48. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).  Although 
education is one of the most important services performed by the State, it is not within the limited 
category of rights recognized by the Supreme Court as guaranteed by the Constitution.  Id. at 35.  
Therefore, education is not subject to heightened protection as a fundamental liberty interest and 
it would be inappropriate for the Court to apply strict scrutiny in this case.  See id. at 36-70.  
Given the broad range of harms resulting from the use of this technology, the Court will 
unquestionably locate a rational basis for regulation. 
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B. Constitutional Sources of Protection of Procreation, Reproduction and 
Family Interests 
When considering the reach of constitutional protections afforded to rights 
related to family, procreation and children, the Supreme Court often bases its 
decisions on a combination of rights implicated under the Due Process Clause, 
constitutional guarantees in the realm of personal privacy and the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Since the Court and the legislature have yet to address the 
constitutionality of the regulation of preconception sex and trait selection, 
rights related to contraception, abortion, marriage and family will be 
considered in this Comment. Advocates of the unregulated use of reproductive 
technologies for parental sex and trait selection erroneously cite these cases as 
lending support for their position.  In response, this section will examine the 
extent of those constitutional guarantees and why they should not be extended 
to permit the use of these harmful reproductive technologies.49 
1. Protection of Personal and Family Decisions Under the Due Process 
Clause 
Guarantees of substantive due process protect matters relating to marriage, 
family and procreation.50  The scope of the pre-birth liberty rights to select 
offspring sex and characteristics depends upon inquiries into whether the 
characteristic in question is central or material to a reproductive decision, and 
the nature, severity and probability of harms that flow from the pre-birth 
selection of characteristics.51  The Due Process Clause of the Constitution 
includes a substantive component, which provides heightened protection 
 
 49. See John A. Robertson, Noncoital Reproduction and Procreative Liberty, in THE ETHICS 
OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 252 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992) (discussing the “scope of 
procreative liberty and the extent of constitutional protection for noncoital conception and its 
collaborative variations”). 
 50. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (citing family law cases in a criminal 
procedure case, the Court addressed its reluctance to expand the rights protected by substantive 
due process). 
 51. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 429.  The harms may include “destruction of embryos 
and fetuses, harm to offspring, instrumentalizing or commodifying human life, discrimination on 
the basis of gender or disability, and easing the way to non-medical enhancement.”  Id.  Whether 
the characteristic is central or material to the reproductive decision is one aspect that also 
implicates the question of whether the characteristic should be central or material to the 
reproductive decision.  Id.  Generally, it is unacceptable for any characteristic selected for non-
medical reasons to influence parents’ decision whether or not to give birth to such a child.  Id. at 
436.  For instance, our society accepts the notion that parents may choose not to have a child who 
will suffer from a serious genetic disease, but will not tolerate the idea that parents may choose 
not to have a child because the child has the wrong hair color.  Id. 
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against government interference with individual liberty interests under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.52 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution extends to the states the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause’s guarantee that “no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”53  “Liberty” 
denotes 
not merely freedom from bodily restraint[,] but also the right of the individual 
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and bring up children . . . and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and women].54 
The right to have children has also been upheld on the ground that an 
individual has a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of equal 
protection under the law.55  The Supreme Court considered the right to have 
children one of the “basic civil rights of man” which deserved protection as a 
fundamental right.56  Liberty protection is also afforded in some circumstances 
to marry, have children, direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, 
use of contraception, bodily integrity, and abortion.57  However, the Court 
 
 52. The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
extends this prohibition to the states, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST.  amend. XIV.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (holding that the Washington child visitation law violated parents’ 
fundamental right to make decisions related to the care, custody, and control of their children by 
permitting any person to seek visitation of the children even though the parents object to such 
visitation). 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 54. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted).  In Meyer, an 
instructor at a parochial school in Nebraska was convicted of unlawfully teaching the subject of 
reading in the German language to a ten-year-old child.  Id. at 396-97.  At the time the court 
convicted the instructor, a Nebraska law prohibited the teaching of any language other than 
English at any public or private school.  Id. at 397.  Justice McReynolds’ majority opinion held 
that the statute infringed upon parents’ liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 400.  In striking down the Nebraska law, the Court focused on the importance 
of education.  The Court rejected the state’s argument that a rational state interest existed, holding 
that a child’s learning the German language was not injurious to the health, morals, or 
understanding of the ordinary child.  Id. at 403.  See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 
49, 65 (1973) (emphasizing the Court’s precedent that commercial activities are not “private” 
matters protected by constitutional rights of privacy). 
 55. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  In Skinner, the 
Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in which the state law called for sterilization of criminals convicted of 
two or more felonies involving moral turpitude.  Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion made it evident that people do not have an unlimited right to do with their 
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limits fundamental liberty interests and urges restraint when considering 
expanding fundamental liberty interests.58 For instance, fundamental liberty 
interest protection has not been extended to the right of children’s education 
and the right to engage sexual activity in the privacy of one’s own home 
between two consenting adults.59 
2. Constitutional Guarantee of Personal Privacy 
A personal right of privacy, or at least a guarantee of certain areas or zones 
or privacy, is constitutionally protected.  While no explicit textual basis exists 
for the right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized this right on several 
occasions.60  Under certain circumstances, the right of personal privacy 
encompasses the right to marry,61 procreate,62 use contraception63 and abort a 
 
bodies as they please.  The Court in Glucksberg held that the right to assistance in committing 
suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 728. 
 58. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality 
of a Georgia sodomy statute). 
 59. See id. at 191.  See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 
(1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right in an equal protection case challenging a 
state educational funding plan on the basis that it discriminated against students who resided in 
poorer districts). 
 60. The Court has cited various sources for this right of privacy, including the Ninth 
Amendment, and the “penumbras” or “emanations” of provisions of the Bill of Rights.  See 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  In Griswold, the Planned Parenthood 
League’s directors were convicted under the Connecticut birth control law for providing 
contraceptive devices and relevant information to married couples.  Id. at 480.  The Supreme 
Court, per Justice Douglas, held that the Connecticut law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the 
right of marital privacy.  Id. at 485.  The law, by “forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than 
regulating their manufacture or sale, [sought] to achieve its goal by means having a maximum 
destructive relationship on a marital relationship.”  Id. 
 61. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (referring to the right to marry as a “basic civil 
right”).  In Loving, Warren’s majority held that the miscegenation statutes adopted by Virginia to 
prevent marriages between persons solely on basis of racial classification violated equal 
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 2.  States have the power 
to regulate marriage, but only to a certain degree.  Id. at 7.  The Court found an invidious racial 
discrimination in Virginia’s statute prohibiting marriage between different races.  Id. at 12. 
 62. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (invalidating a 
statute providing for the sterilization of “habitual criminals”).  The Court held that the right to 
procreate is “one of the basic civil rights of [humans]” and classifications affecting it are judged 
by the strict equal protection test.  Id. at 541. 
 63. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (recognizing marital privacy as one of the specific 
penumbras of privacy found in the Bill of Rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) 
(holding that the right to use contraception was an individual privacy right which applied to 
single persons as well as to married persons); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 678 
(1977) (holding that a state cannot prohibit distribution of non-medical contraceptives to adults 
except through license pharmacists, nor prohibit sales of such contraceptives to persons under age 
sixteen  who did not have approval of a licensed physician).  See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 
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fetus.  “But it is a mistake to equate privacy with a general constitutional right 
to engage in any or all of these important activities free from governmental 
interference.”64  The Court advocates the use of great restraint when expanding 
the contours of constitutional due process.65 
The right of personal privacy exists under the Constitution, and only 
personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty are included in the guarantee of personal privacy.66  The right 
of privacy guaranteed by the Constitution includes only an individual’s 
personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.67  This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal 
intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, child 
rearing68 and education.69  It is broad enough to encompass a woman’s right to 
choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy in certain circumstances.70 
 
U.S. 113, 152-57 (1973) (noting that this right of personal privacy is implicit in the concept of 
“liberty” within the protection of the Due Process Clause). 
 64. Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1998).  “[T]he constitutional right of privacy casts a mantle of 
immunity from state interference around certain intimate and consensual relationships.”  Id.  
When individuals call upon the state to assist them actively in their interactions with other 
individuals, this right of privacy dissipates.  Id. at 1079.  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
196 (1986) (upholding state criminal charges against a gay man charged with violating a state law 
criminalizing sodomy).  In Bowers, Justice White’s majority opinion held that the Constitution 
does not grant a fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.  Id. at 191.  The 
Georgia statute was constitutional given the fact that a fundamental right was not involved and 
the state provided a rational basis for the statute.  Id. at 196. 
 65. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (refusing to expand fundamental rights even when the activity 
occurred in the privacy of one’s home).  Historically, fundamental liberties identified by the 
Court include liberties implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or liberties deeply rooted in this 
nation’s history and traditions.  Id. at 191. 
 66. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.  If a zone of privacy is identified, the state must narrowly draw a 
regulation to serve a compelling interest for the government to constitutionally intrude upon this 
zone.  Id. at 155.  The use of preconception sex and trait selection does not implicate a privacy 
right, so the courts will use a “rational basis” test to uphold laws in this area.  Id.  The security of 
one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion from the government is basic to a free society and 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and as such it is enforceable against the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.  Id. at 152-53. 
 67. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).  Chief Justice Burger noted 
that conduct, which directly involves “consenting adults”, does not have, for that sole reason, 
special claim to constitutional protection.  Id. at 68.  The states have a legitimate interest in 
regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all places of public 
accommodation.  Id. at 69.  Georgia had a legitimate state interest in keeping adolescents from 
exposure to the obscene material.  Id.  Furthermore, there is no privacy right in a commercial 
theater.  Id.  Likewise, no special relationship exists when a couple visits a medical institution to 
control the gender fate of the their potential child. 
 68. See id. at 65. 
 69. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that legislation that 
mandated normal children aged eight to sixteen attend public school unreasonably interfered with 
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The rights of privacy under the Constitution should not extend to parents’ 
use of reproductive technologies to make these decisions since the matters 
involved in selecting a child’s sex or characteristics are not fundamental rights.  
While precedent suggests some limits to these constitutional guarantees of 
privacy, the outer limits of protected liberty interests have yet to be definitively 
established.71  Based on family and reproductive precedent, some argue that 
parents’ decisions to select the sex and traits of their children are within this 
realm of protected liberty interests.72  The Supreme Court cases analyzing the 
realm of protected liberty interests reveal that the interests implicated by 
parents’ use of preconception sex and trait selection technologies are not as 
fundamental to the “common occupations of life” nor “as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” as the rights involved in these prior 
decisions.  Privacy should not be equated with a license to engage in any 
personal activity without state interference.73  Constitutional privacy rights do 
not provide individuals with a right to enter the commerce of reproduction 
because such activities do not implicate private relationships.74 
C. Historical Protection of Decisions Related to Procreation, Family and 
Children Does Not Extend to the Use of Preconception Sex and Trait 
Selection Technologies 
1. Parents’ Right in the Care and Upbringing of their Children Does Not 
Extend to the Right to Use Sex and Trait Selection Technologies. 
Freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life 
are liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
parental rights); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (concluding that the right of 
parents to instruct their children was within the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 70. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 71. See Jones, supra note 4, at 189 (noting that the boundaries of personal liberty into which 
the government may not enter continue to be the subject of considerable debate).  See also Rao, 
supra note 64, at 1077-78 (arguing that privacy is currently miscast as a misunderstood individual 
right that must be reconceived as a relational right in order to capture its social dimension). 
 72. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 424-25 (asserting that a stronger argument may be made 
for the use of reproductive technologies as a liberty interest under reproductive freedom than 
under parents’ rights to control their child’s upbringing because of the close connection between 
the characteristics of the child and the decision whether or not to reproduce).  See also Robertson, 
supra note 49, at 252 (focusing on the rights of married persons to reproduce through the use of 
reproductive technologies). 
 73. See Rao, supra note 64, at 1078.  The right of privacy, according to Rao, “casts a mantle 
of immunity from state interference around certain intimate and consensual relationships,” but 
should not be equated with a general constitutional guarantee to engage in any family, child 
rearing or sexual activity without governmental interference.  Id. 
 74. Id. at 1079  (discussing the applicability of the right to privacy to a variety of assisted 
reproductive technologies). 
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Amendment.75  The Supreme Court recognized parents’ fundamental liberty 
interest in the care, custody, upbringing, management76 and control of their 
children.77  These matters may involve the intimate and personal choices, 
which are central to personal dignity and autonomy, and liberty interests, 
which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.78 
In 1925, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society Sisters recognized parents’ 
constitutionally protected interest in raising their children in accordance with 
their preferences.79  In Pierce, the Court declared that an Oregon law requiring 
attendance at public schools unconstitutionally violated parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest in directing the upbringing and education of their 
children.80  In his majority opinion, Justice McReynolds recognized that 
parents who “nurture [a child] and direct [the child’s] destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [her or] him for 
additional obligations.”81  In establishing parents’ right to select the forum for 
their children’s education, the Court affirmed a state’s authority to supervise 
all schools.82 
 
 75. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).  See also Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (including length 
of time grandparents may visit with the grandchildren). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, includes a substantive component that 
provides heightened protection from government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests, including parents rights to make decisions as to care, custody and control of their 
children.  Id. 
 76. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that a New York statute’s “fair 
preponderance of the evidence” standard necessary to permanently take children away from their 
natural parents denied the parents’ due process and that the state must support its allegations with 
at least clear and convincing evidence). 
 77. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affirming parents’ right to 
control their offspring except where, to here, that right conflicts with other state laws).  The 
defendant, who was the children’s custodian, was convicted of furnishing a child with magazines 
to unlawfully sell them on the street.  Id.  Accord Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64 (holding a Washington 
state statute providing that any person may petition the court for visitation with a child at any 
time and the court may grant such visitation rights, violated parents’ liberty interests by 
substituting the judgment of the court for the parents’ judgment). 
 78. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (reviewing 
the history of cases protecting family and procreative decisions to set the stage for the Court’s 
analysis of the Pennsylvania abortion statute which restricted abortion). 
 79. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).  Pierce involved two lawsuits by religious academic 
institutions enjoining the State of Oregon from enforcing the Compulsory Education Act of 1922, 
which required children to attend public schools.  Id. at 529-30. 
 80. Id. at 534-35 (noting that the state has authority to compel children to attend an 
educational institution and to inspect, supervise, and examine those institutions). 
 81. Id .at 535. 
 82. Id. at 534 (indicating that the state regulates educational institutions on the subjects 
taught, teachers, the requirement that children attend an educational institution, and the state’s 
authority to inspect, examine, and supervise schools). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] ENDING PARENTS’ UNLIMITED POWER TO CHOOSE 533 
In reaffirming parents’ limited freedom from state interference with the 
care, custody, and nurture of their children in Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Court emphasized that the rights of parents are not beyond limitation.83  In a 
five to four majority opinion, Justice Rutledge indicated that the state has a 
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things 
affecting the child’s welfare, even if parents’ decisions rest on religious or 
ethical grounds.84  The Court based its decision on the rationale that a 
“democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded 
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,” and the state may take a 
broad range of actions to promote this goal.85 
The Constitution affords protection to the right to have and raise offspring 
without undue state interference.86  In reaching its conclusion in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma that the Oklahoma regulation providing for the sterilization of 
certain criminals was unconstitutional, the Court stated, “Marriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of [humans].”87  
The Court considered the subtle, far reaching, and devastating effects of 
sterilization.88  The Court’s majority argument in Skinner lends support to the 
argument that preconception selection of offspring sex and characteristics 
should be regulated.  An individual’s right to have children is based on the fact 
that procreation is essential to the proliferation of our species.89  Similar to 
 
 83. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 84. See id. at 168 (noting that the state’s power is not nullified by parents’ claims that their 
acts in relation to their children’s care and upbringing are based on religious or ethical rationales).  
The Court also noted that a parent’s religious beliefs do not put parents at liberty to claim their 
children should not be subject to compulsory vaccination, therefore exposing their children to 
communicable diseases, ill health, or death.  Id. 
 85. See id. (indicating that the state’s right to regulate activities related to children is broader 
than its right to regulate adult’s activities).  Based upon this proposition, sex selection should be a 
prime candidate for legislation because it deeply impacts the lives of our children. 
 86. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that constitutional liberty includes 
the right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children). 
 87. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the 
Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act which called for the operation of vasectomy to be 
performed on a criminal defendant who was convicted of stealing chickens and robbery with 
firearms violated defendant’s equal protection rights). 
 88. Id.  “In evil or reckless hands, [this method of punishment] can cause races or types 
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”  Id.  The majority focused on 
the irreparable harm that may result if the state is permitted to meddle with eugenics in this 
fashion.  See id.  Interestingly, the Court addressed concerns in its Skinner opinion that are 
analogous to the hazards inherent in the use of preconception sex and trait selection.  In both 
instances, the state attempts to use eugenics to build a race with more favorable qualities, but the 
dangers in engaging in this type of science outweigh the grave risks. 
 89. Id.  Justice Douglas focused on the fact that Oklahoma’s statute deprives an individual’s 
basic right to have offspring.  See id.  The Court’s opposition to Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal 
Sterilization law seemed to be based, in part, on the state’s alteration of the natural reproductive 
process by sterilizing criminals.  Id. 
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sterilization, the selection of offspring characteristics jeopardizes the future of 
humanity.90  Moreover, if parents select the sex and characteristics of their 
offspring, they will alter the natural reproductive process, which may result in 
serious adverse consequences to both the child herself or himself and to others 
in the child’s environment.91 
The Court elaborated in a subsequent decision, Wisconsin v. Yoder, that 
“the history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of 
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.”92  The 
government should not include preconception methods in the realm of child 
rearing and upbringing decisions previously protected by the Court.  Parents 
make child-rearing decisions throughout the child’s life-time, while adjusting 
their decisions to accommodate for the changing needs of the child.  In 
contrast, parents’ choice to select the sex and traits of their children is a single 
decision made prior to birth, at a time when it is difficult for parents to 
ascertain whether the decisions they implement are in the best interest of their 
child. 
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court stated that another fundamental right under 
the Due Process Clause is the right to be free, except in limited circumstances, 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.93  Justice White’s 
majority opinion in Stanley held that an unwed father was entitled to a hearing 
testing his fitness as a father before his children could be taken away from him 
subsequent to the death of the children’s mother.94  The policy under Illinois 
law for considering unwed fathers as unfit parents but considering married 
fathers as fit parents violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.95  
Following the Meyer line of cases, White’s majority opinion struck down the 
law as “it needlessly risk[ed] running roughshod over the important interests of 
 
 90. See infra Part III. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1971). 
 93. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). 
 94. Id.  An unwed father whose children, on the mother’s death, were by Illinois law 
declared state wards and placed in guardianship, attacked the Illinois statutory scheme as a denial 
of equal protection of the laws.  Id. at 646.  Under the Illinois law, the children of unmarried 
fathers, upon the death of the mother, were declared dependents without any hearing on parental 
fitness and without proof of neglect, although such hearing and proof were required for unmarried 
mothers in the father’s situation.  Id. at 646-47. 
 95. Id.  Even if the State was correct that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and 
neglectful parents, all unmarried fathers are not in this category.  Id. at 650.  To presume the 
father in this case was such an unsuitable father violated his Due Process rights.  Id. at 657.  The 
Court based its decision to promote the state of moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of 
the minor child, the best interests of the community and the strengthening of the minor’s family 
ties.  Id. at 651-52. 
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both parent and child.”96  This right of privacy protects Americans’ beliefs, 
thoughts, emotions and sensations. 
The rights of biological parents are limited, and may be outweighed by 
public policy and the “best interests of the child.”97  For instance, in Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court cited policy reasons when holding that a 
California statute which creates a presumption that a child born to a married 
woman living with her husband is the child of the husband (provided the 
husband is not impotent or sterile) did not violate procedural due process rights 
of the putative biological father.98  With sex and trait selection, the public 
policy issues and the “best interests of the child” standard outweigh any rights 
parents may have in controlling the genetic makeup of their children. 
The Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville struck down a Washington 
statute providing that any person may petition a court for visitation at any time 
and that court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may 
serve the best interests of the child.99  The Court held that the statute violated 
substantive due process rights of parents.100  In Troxel, the mother’s due 
process rights were violated by the application of the Washington statute which 
permitted the court to use its own discretion to award increased visitation to 
paternal grandparents, following the death of children’s father, in disagreement 
with the mother’s decision.101 
 
 96. Id. at 657.  In Stanley, the child’s father lived with the child’s mother for eighteen years 
but never married.  Id. at 646.  Under the Illinois statutory scheme, the children of an unwed 
father upon the death of the mother, were declared dependents of the state without any hearing of 
parental fitness and without any showing of neglect.  Id.  Despite the possibility that unmarried 
fathers are unfit parents, Due Process dictates that fathers are entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  
Id. at 658.  All Illinois parents are entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are 
removed from their custody.  Id.  The Court disregarded the state’s reasons for this regulation.  Id. 
 97. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  Accord Henne v. Wright, 
904 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that parents do not have a fundamental right to give 
their child a surname at birth with which the child has no legally established parental connection, 
and state statute bore a rational relationship to legitimate state interests); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652  
(indicating the state’s protection of the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the 
minor and the best interests of the community and the strengthening of the minor’s family ties 
whenever possible are legitimate interests well within the power of the state to implement). 
 98. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125-30.  Despite blood test results which indicated a 98.07% 
probability of paternity, the putative father was not permitted the opportunity to demonstrate 
paternity as it violated California’s public policy of protection of  “family integrity and privacy.”  
Id. at 110, 120.  The Court emphasized that the Due Process Clause affords only those protections 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.  Id. at 
122. 
 99. 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (indicating that, at a minimum, the trial judge should have afforded special weight to 
a mother’s determination of the appropriate amount of visitation between children and 
grandparents when considering the best interests of the children). 
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The above cases do not consider the extent to which parents’ interests in 
their children’s “upbringing” extends to parents’ rights to select the sex and 
characteristics of their children.  In fact, federal courts have yet to decide 
whether the use of any reproductive technologies should be afforded 
constitutional protection.  When courts make this decision, they should 
recognize the unique nature of the issues and harms presented by 
preconception sex and trait selection.102  While the courts traditionally 
recognized parents’ freedom to make decisions for their children (or potential 
children), the rights and best interests of children are not unrecognized.103  
When considering sex and trait selection, both parent and child have 
compelling interests in this process.  If sex and trait selection based on parental 
preference is prohibited, parents’ rights in the care and upbringing of their 
children after birth will not be limited in any manner.104  Parents will still enjoy 
the same freedoms to care and make decisions for their children as they had in 
the past. 
When the Supreme Court decided Pierce in 1925 or Prince in 1944, it did 
not anticipate the potential meanings of a parent’s duty to “[control] the 
[child’s] destiny” eighty years later. 105  However, the fact remains that the 
government may regulate parents’ decisions when necessary to avoid harm.  
Similar to parents’ choice of education and religious upbringing of their 
children, parents’ selection of the sex and characteristics of their children are 
methods for parents to give their children what the parents believe are the 
“best” options available to enhance their children’s opportunities for success in 
life.  However, parents’ use of sex and trait selection reproductive technologies 
has more potential to cause devastating harm than education and religious 
decisions. 
Permitting parents to select their children’s sex and traits gives parents 
unprecedented control over their children’s “destiny.”  The state has a strong 
interest in assuring that children are well-educated so that when the children 
reach adulthood, they will be capable to perform in the work place and support 
themselves.  Similarly, the state also has a substantial interest in assuring that 
the United States does not incur problems which may be associated with the 
use of sex and trait selection technologies, such as gender imbalance in the 
population, serious psychological and social consequences to children resulting 
from knowledge that they were altered by their parents’ whims or that they 
were a mistake whom their parents did not desire, adverse consequences due to 
alteration of natural selection, and discrimination against those who do not 
 
 102. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64. 
 104. Sex and trait selection based on parental preference is distinguished from sex selection 
for medical reasons, a topic which is not addressed in this Note. 
 105. See Pierce v. Soc’y Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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have the opportunities to utilize sex and trait selection technologies.  Like 
education, sex and trait selection should be highly regulated by the state to 
ensure that when children are born and grow into adulthood they are prepared 
to meet the challenges they will face, and that society will not suffer as a result 
of parents’ decisions. 
C. The Right to Choose Whether or Not to Have Children Does Not Extend 
to the Right to Use Sex and Trait Selection Technologies 
The Due Process guarantee of freedom from undue government 
interference extends to the decision to have a child without undue interference 
from the state.106  In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, a regulation 
requiring teachers to take an unpaid mandatory maternity leave four to five 
months prior to the anticipated birth of their child violated the teachers’ due 
process rights by penalizing teachers for asserting their rights to have 
children.107 
Privacy rights also include the right to choose measures to not have 
children.108  The Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, affirmed a right to be 
free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child in Eisenstadt 
v. Baird.109  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court, per Justice 
Douglas, struck down a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of 
contraceptives because the Connecticut regulation unconstitutionally intruded 
upon the right of marital privacy.110  Justice Douglas’ plurality opinion focused 
on the private nature of the decision to use contraceptives within the sanctity of 
 
 106. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (holding that 
mandatory school board rules denied the teachers’ due process because the mandatory maternity 
leave burdens teachers’ liberty interests by presuming that a teacher who is four or five months 
pregnant is physically incapable of performing her duties and provisions furthered no legitimate 
state interest); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (affirming that a woman’s 
decision to conceive or to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution). 
 107. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 650 (The school board impinged on teachers’ right to be free from 
governmental intrusion on their decision whether or not to have a child.). 
 108. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (reversing the lower court’s 
conviction of a medical director who provided information, instruction and medical advice to 
married persons regarding methods of conception). 
 109. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding a Massachusetts statute that permitted married 
persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but prohibited distribution of 
contraceptives to single persons for that purpose violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 110. 381 U.S. at 485.  Justice Douglas did not rely on a specific Amendment for the guarantee 
of privacy in this case, but instead discussed specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights which create 
zones, or penumbras, of privacy.  Id. at 486.  The Connecticut law forbidding the use of 
contraception unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy.  Id. at 486.  This right 
may be found in first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.  Id, at 484-85. 
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the marital relationship.111  Affirming Griswold, Justice Brennan’s plurality in 
Eisenstadt further refined the boundaries of the realm of personal privacy in 
holding that, under the Equal Protection Clause, an individual’s right of 
privacy extends to the right for both married and single persons to have access 
to contraceptives.112 
While privacy rights include the right to choose to use measures to not 
have children 113 and the right to have children,114 they do not extend to permit 
parents to choose to have children only with special characteristics.  The 
decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt focused on the personal and intimate 
nature of the couple’s private decision to use contraception.  The Court 
expressed its reluctance to enter a sexually intimate couple’s bedroom, but the 
couple breaks their private sphere when it leaves its bedroom to visit a medical 
facility in contemplation of using reproductive technologies.  Thus, the couple 
seeking a child with certain traits should not be afforded the same protection as 
a couple who maintains its privacy. 
D. The Right to Have an Abortion Does Not Extend to the Right to Use Sex 
and Trait Selection Technologies 
In 1973, Justice Blackmun’s 7-2 majority opinion in Roe v. Wade first 
recognized a woman’s right to elect to have an abortion prior to the viability of 
a fetus without undue government interference.115  The Court concluded that 
the right of personal privacy includes the right to choose an abortion, but this 
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests 
 
 111. Id. at 485-86.  The Court expressed disgust at the nature of enforcement mechanism 
which would require entering the marital bedroom.  Id. at 485-86.  In contrast, regulation of sex 
and trait selection would not require entering the marital bedroom.  Id. at 485-86.  The legislation 
would aim at medical facilities, which are the target of substantial regulation to maintain health 
and prevent harm. 
 112. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.  The Court did not address a person’s right to access 
contraceptives themselves.  See id.  Instead, the Court, in following Griswold, indicated that if 
contraceptives are to be accessible to married persons, the same access to contraceptives must be 
available to non-married individuals.  Id. at 454. 
 113. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
 114. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding a woman’s 
fundamental right to privacy encompasses the right to make reproductive decisions, free of 
governmental interference, to submit to medical procedures that bring about, rather than prevent, 
pregnancy).  In Lifchez, the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois struck down an 
Illinois law as unconstitutionally vague and violative of fundamental privacy in that it was 
unclear whether it made it illegal for couples to submit to medical procedures permitting them to 
have children when the couples would otherwise be childless.  Id. at 1372-77. 
 115. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)  (State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life 
becomes a “compelling” interest at viability).  In response to a class action, brought by a single 
pregnant woman who was denied an abortion, challenging a Texas statute, the Court struck down 
the Texas criminal abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except as 
medically necessary to save the life of the mother.  Id. 
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in regulation.116  Further constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to 
terminate pregnancy before viability derives from the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.117 
In determining that this right of personal privacy existed, the Court focused 
on the woman’s distress during the pregnancy and in the future, including her 
imminent psychological harm, mental and physical health concerns involved 
with raising a child, the distress associated with having an unwanted child, the 
complications associated with bringing up a child in a family who does not 
want or is not prepared for the child, and the stigma found by unwed 
mothers.118  While the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty 
was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy,” the Court nonetheless placed the “basic 
responsibility” for the abortion decision with the physician and characterized 
the decision as “inherently, and primarily, a medical decision.”119 
In a 7-2 opinion issued with Roe, the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton 
struck down a Georgia statute banning abortions except when a pregnancy 
would endanger a woman’s life or seriously and permanently injure her health, 
the fetus would be “very likely to be born with grave, permanent, and 
irremediable mental or physical defect,” or the pregnancy resulted from a 
rape.120  As in Roe, the Supreme Court, per Justice Blackmun, recognized that 
a pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to abortion on 
demand.121  States may, according to the Court, justify an abortion statute 
 
 116. Id. at 154.  The Court noted that important State interests may include safeguarding 
health in maintaining medical standards and protecting potential life.  Id. at 154.  The State 
interests addressed in this opinion are congruent with the interests the State has in regulating 
preconception sex and trait selection.  Id. at 156.  It is clear from this opinion that a person does 
not have an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases.  Id.  The statute in this case 
outstripped the state’s justifications and swept beyond any areas of compelling interest.  Id. 
 117. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (affirming 
the central holding in Roe, while clarifying the source of the right of personal privacy).  In Roe, 
the Court indicated that whether or not the right was founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action, it was in the Ninth Amendment’s 
reservation of rights to the people.  410 U.S. at 153. 
 118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  The Court specifically disagreed with Petitioner’s argument that 
women are entitled to terminate pregnancies without constraints.  Id. at 154.  In defending a 
constitutionally protected “private sphere of individual liberty,” Justice Blackmun stressed the 
personal, intimate, private, and individual dignity and autonomy involved in a woman’s decision 
to have an abortion.  Id. at 192. 
 119. Id. at 166. 
 120. 410 U.S. 179, 183, 197-201 (1973).  Blackmun’s majority indicated that the woman’s 
health includes a consideration of all relevant factors, such as the woman’s physical and 
emotional state, familial situation, and the woman’s age.  Id. at 192. 
 121. See id. at 189 (reaffirming Roe).  See also id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice 
White, in his dissent in Doe, lamented about the Court’s decision which seemingly valued the 
convenience of the pregnant woman over the potential life that she carries.  Id.  As reproductive 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
540 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:517 
protecting the interest of embryonic and fetal life.122  Similar to the Court’s 
concern in Doe that the government regulates medical procedures associated 
with pregnancy, the government has an interest in the use of reproductive 
technologies associated with preconception sex and trait selection. 
The Constitutional protection afforded to women’s right to abortion 
without state interference is not without limits.123  The State has an obligation 
to regulate to safeguard health, maintain medical standards, and protect 
potential life.124 
The plurality opinion in Casey quoted the majority in Roe for the 
proposition that while the decision to have an abortion “is more than a 
philosophical exercise,” it is also conduct “fraught with consequences for 
others.”125  The state may assert its interest in potential life throughout 
pregnancy.126  Casey also stands for the proposition that stated that 
“[r]eproductive decisions affect offspring and may lead directly to burdens” on 
third parties.127  While there have been few efforts to ensure reproductive 
responsibility and the notion of reproductive responsibility has not been 
addressed in countries without population problems, innovations in 
reproductive technology will force individuals and the legislature to consider 
issues of reproductive responsibility.128 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a plurality defined “fundamental” rights as 
those rights which have traditionally been protected by the court.129 The right 
 
technologies such as preconception sex selection become available, the need to halt the slippery 
slope into unrestricted reproductive health that began with Roe is evident.  Id. 
 122. Id. at 190-91. 
 123. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  See also 
Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 133 (1992) 
(discussing the Court’s decisions subsequent to Roe which permit a wide range of restrictions on 
access to abortion prior to viability). 
 124. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
 125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.  According to the Court, the others are “the persons who perform 
and assist in the procedure . . . the spouse, family, and society which must confront the 
knowledge that these procedures exist . . . and depending on one’s beliefs . . . the life or potential 
life that is aborted.”  Id.  See McClain, supra note 123, at 139 (indicating that this point is where 
tension arises between a woman’s liberty and the state’s interest in potential life). 
 126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
 127. Robertson, supra note 49, at 251. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989).  Not all sexual conduct is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See id.  The Court in Michael H. rejected an adulterous natural father’s claim that 
he had a due process right to maintain a paternal relationship with the child.  Id. at 122-27.  Under 
California law, the mother’s husband who was living with her at the time of the child’s birth was 
presumed to be the child’s father.  Id. at 117-18.  The Court halted before expanding the contours 
of due process to protect men who sire children.  See id. at 122-27.  California’s presumption that 
the mother’s husband was the father’s child protected higher values than those inherent in 
recognizing the rights of the biological father.  Id. at 122-23.  See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] ENDING PARENTS’ UNLIMITED POWER TO CHOOSE 541 
to have an abortion is limited by medical and social interests.130  While 
protecting the rights of women deciding whether or not to bear a child, the 
Court recognized that a woman’s choice bears consequences for others which 
may be significant.  Any right a woman has to terminate her pregnancy relies 
on the consequences the act may have on herself and others.131 
No right exists “to enter the commerce of reproduction . . . because such 
activities do not implicate private relationships.”132  Preconception sex and trait 
selection clearly does not fall within the realm of rights traditionally protected 
by the court as fundamental rights.  The composition of families has rapidly 
evolved in the past couple decades, but the law does not protect the majority of 
these changes.133  The Court will uphold laws prohibiting or restricting the use 
of these reproductive technologies by applying a rational basis review. 
In Casey, the Supreme Court affirmed Roe in a joint opinion, where the 
Court’s plurality held that a woman is afforded a constitutional right to obtain 
an abortion prior to viability without undue interference from the state.134  The 
Supreme Court also recognized, “the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.”135 
 
U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy laws while denying the argument that 
homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right deserving of constitutional protection). 
 130. See Hogsdon v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990) (upholding a state requirement 
that a minor wait forty-eight hours after notifying a single parent of her intention to get an 
abortion).  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion agreed with the state that this restriction on 
abortion furthered the State’s legitimate interest in ensuring that the minor’s decision is knowing 
and intelligent.  Id. at 448.  In reaching its decision, the Court explained that the time provided the 
parents with the opportunity to ensure that the doctor performing the abortion was qualified and 
to discuss the moral implications with their daughter who seeks an abortion.  Id. at 448-49.  The 
State has an interest in ensuring the welfare of the minor undergoing the abortion.  Id. 
 131. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
 132. See Rao, supra note 64, at 1079.  Rao refers to all “new” reproductive technologies, 
including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, sperm donations, embryo donations, and 
surrogacy.  Id.  Some lower courts have upheld decisions prohibiting parents from paying for the 
adoption or surrogacy of children.  Id.  For instance, in Doe v. Kelley, the Michigan appellate 
court held that the parents’ fundamental right to have a child is not impinged on by state laws 
making it illegal to pay consideration to adopt a child or to have another woman carry the child 
during pregnancy. 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
 133. For example, families may presently incorporate homosexual couples, surrogate parents, 
babies born with the eggs or sperm of third parties, divorced parents, and single parents. 
 134. 505 U.S. at 846 (examining the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statue which required 
minors to notify their parents prior to obtaining an abortion and required wives to notify their 
husband’s prior to abortion). 
 135. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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Interpreting Roe, the Supreme Court, in Maher v. Roe, clarified that an 
unqualified constitutional right to have an abortion does not exist.136  Maher 
stated that “[a] pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right 
to have an abortion on her demand.”137  While the right to have an abortion is 
protected by a general right of privacy and as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interest, the right to have an abortion is not without limits and is afforded less 
protection than some constitutional rights, such as the right to free speech.138  
Further, the Constitution does not prohibit a state or city from expressing a 
preference for “normal” childbirth.139 
In order “[t]o protect the central right recognized in Roe v. Wade while at 
the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in potential life,” 
the Court employed an undue burden analysis.140  “An undue burden exists, 
and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”141 
The rationale behind the constitutional protection afforded to a woman’s 
right to elect to have an abortion under certain circumstances is that 
considering a woman’s education, employment skills, financial resources, and 
emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome 
for a woman.142  The Supreme Court explained that a pregnant woman’s 
suffering is “too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, 
 
 136. 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977).  See also Planned Parenthood Ass’n of the Atlanta Area, 
Inc. v. Harris, 670 F. Supp. 971, 983-85 (N.D. Ga. 1987).  The Court, in Harris, held that the 
state has a legitimate interest in promoting parental consultation with a minor who is seeking 
abortion because of the minor’s presumed inability to make important decisions in an informed, 
mature manner, and serious concerns implicated by decision to have an abortion.  Id.  A statute 
requiring a minor to notify her parents prior to aborting a fetus can satisfy due process if it is 
narrowly tailored to promote the state’s significant interests.  Id.  In this case, Georgia’s broad 
statute violated due process.  Id. 
 137. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973). 
 138. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993).  “Abortion clinics 
and abortion rights organizations applied for permanent injunction to enjoin anti-abortion 
organization and members from trespassing on, impeding, or obstructing ingress to or egress from 
facilities providing abortion services and related counseling.”  Id.  The Supreme Court, per Justice 
Scalia, held that the goal of preventing abortion does not qualify as an invidiously discriminatory 
animus directed at women in general, and an anti-abortion demonstration’s incidental effect on 
some women’s right to interstate travel did not suffice to show conspiracy to deprive those 
women of their protected interstate travel right.  Id. 
 139. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989).  See also Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) (involving the situation in which the government expresses a preference 
in funding childbirth). 
 140. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (emphasis 
added).  The Supreme Court, per Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, abandoned the “strict 
scrutiny” standard.  Id.  The very notion that the state has a substantial interest in potential life 
leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.  Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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upon its own vision of [a] woman’s role.”143  Casey links reproductive choice 
to a woman’s existential decisions, her spirituality and her personhood. 144 
The state interests are not strong enough to support the prohibition of 
abortion or interference with the women’s election to obtain an abortion prior 
to viability.145  However, the Court has upheld a state’s power to restrict a 
woman’s decision to elect to have an abortion after fetal viability, “if the law 
contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or 
health.”146  According to the Court, the state has “legitimate interests from the 
[onset] of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of 
the fetus that may become a child.”147 
E. Constitutional Protection of Family and Reproductive Decisions Does not 
Extend to Sex and Trait Selection 
Supporters of preconception sex selection argue that the right to choose the 
sex and characteristics of offspring should be based on an extension of the 
constitutional protection afforded to individual’s rights to make personal 
decisions in the areas of conception, pregnancy, child rearing and family.148  
Individual rights to make decisions concerning family, children, and 
procreation have traditionally found protection in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and constitutional guarantees of privacy.149  The 
values implicated, traditional reproduction and conception matters, are not 
present with sex and trait selection.  While the government permits individuals 
to make family and reproductive decisions, the government limits the 
necessary medical procedures to ensure the health. 
 
 143. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (commenting on the sacrifices involved with child bearing that 
women have made throughout the centuries). 
 144. See McClain, supra note 123, at 140. 
 145. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (affirming the core of Roe). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  See also Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403-04 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to 
address whether a woman’s relationship with her unborn child during pregnancy is a fundamental 
interest).  In Alexander, a mother whose child was stillborn challenged the constitutionality of a 
New Jersey wrongful death and survival statute that denied recovery on behalf of stillborn 
fetuses.  Id. at 1396-97.  Petitioner claimed to have a fundamental liberty interest in her 
relationship with the unborn child.  Id. at 1402-03.  Using a rational basis review because a 
fundamental right was not implicated, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the mother’s 
due process rights were not violated by the New Jersey legislation.  Id. at 1404-06. 
 148. Danis, supra note 12. 
 149. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that although the Constitution 
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the Court has continually recognized a right of 
personal privacy). 
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F. Government Funding Should not be Wasted on the Use of Reproductive 
Technology to Select the Traits or Sex of Offspring 
Even if Congress and the states are constitutionally prohibited from 
enacting legislation to restrain parents from selecting the sex and 
characteristics of their offspring, the federal and state governments are under 
no obligation to fund these detrimental uses of reproductive technologies.  The 
commercialization of reproduction diverts medical resources away from more 
medically necessary research and treatment.150 
If laws are not implemented denying parents’ power to select their 
childrens sex and traits according to their whims, Congress and state 
legislatures should deny any funding for these reproductive technologies.151  
States are not required to fund contraception or a woman’s right to elect an 
abortion, even though these activities are protected from state interference.  In 
Maher v. Roe, the Court upheld a state welfare regulation under which 
Medicaid recipients received payments for services related to childbirth, but 
not for non-therapeutic abortions.152  The state imposed restrictions did not 
impinge upon a woman’s right of privacy on the ground that Roe did not 
prevent a state from making a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion 
and implementing that judgment by the allocation of public funds.153  Webster 
 
 150. See Laura Shanner & Jeffrey Niskee, Bioethics for Clinicians; 26 Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, 64 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1589, 1591 (2001) (lamenting about the way the sale of 
pregnancy, gametes, and embryos in assisted reproductive technologies take advantage of lower 
class women who are paid for their reproductive abilities while the sale of human tissues is 
strictly prohibited).  Research of the long-term affects of reproductive technologies remains to be 
done, so the consequences are uncertain. 
 151. Considering the present cost of reproductive technologies to select a child’s sex, it is 
likely that issues concerning the funding of these procedures will be an issue.  The entire in vitro 
process must be carried out at least twice prior to the preimplantation genetic diagnosis, at a cost 
starting at $11,000 per cycle.  See Faith Lagay, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, VIRTUAL 
MENTOR (Aug.  2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/5717.html (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2002). 
 152. 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (applying a less demanding test of rationality to uphold a 
statute which provided funding for childbirth but not for non-therapeutic abortions).  Accord Beal 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding by a 6-3 majority that a Pennsylvania statute limiting the 
funding of abortion to Medicaid-eligible women to abortions which threaten the woman’s health 
or when the infant may be born with an incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency). 
 153. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-94 (1991).  In Rust, the Supreme Court upheld a 
regulatory scheme under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, which prohibited the use of 
Title X funds for abortion counseling, referral and provision of information regarding abortion as 
a method of family planning.  Id. at 201-02.  According to the Court, the state’s decision to 
provide funding for live births, but not abortion, did not violate Title X recipients’ Fifth 
Amendment rights to choose to terminate a pregnancy.  Id. at 201.  Recipients of family planning 
funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act and doctors who administered Title X funds 
challenged the funding provisions which construed non-therapeutic abortions as beyond “family 
planning” with the meaning of the statute.  Id. at 179.  The majority emphasized that the 
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v. Reproductive Services upheld a prohibition on the use of public facilities for 
medical personnel for providing abortions, even if a woman’s own physician 
plans to perform the abortion.154  In a 6-3 ruling, the Court in Maher 
distinguished between direct state interference with protected activities and 
state encouragement of an alternative activity consistent with legislative 
policy.155 
The Supreme Court reached an analogous result in Harris v. McRae, a 5-4 
decision which upheld the validity of the Hyde Amendment, a state regulation 
which severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of 
abortions under the Medicaid program.156  Justice Stewart’s majority opinion 
focused on the fact that the state’s decision not to fund non-medically 
necessary abortions placed no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman 
who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.157  Maher, Poelker, and McRae all 
 
government has no duty to subsidize an activity merely because it is constitutionally protected.  
Id. at 201. The government, according to the majority, may validly choose to allocate public 
funds for medical services relating to child birth but not to abortion.  Id. at 201-02.  See Beal, 432 
U.S. at 445-46 (holding that the Social Security Act did not require the funding of nontherapeutic 
abortions as a condition of participation in the Medicaid program; reaffirming the policy that the 
state has an important interest in encouraging childbirth, but that interest does not become 
sufficiently compelling until the third trimester to justify unduly burdensome state interference 
with the woman’s constitutionally protected privacy interest). 
 154. 492 U.S. 490, 509-11 (1989). 
 155. 432 U.S. at 475.  The State has a broad power to encourage actions deemed to be in the 
public interest.  The Court sustained the Connecticut funding scheme which prohibited Social 
Security funding for non-medically necessary abortions.  Id. at 478.  Connecticut’s distinction 
between childbirth and non-therapeutic abortion by the regulation was “rationally related” to a 
“constitutionally permissible” purpose.  Id.  The Court relied on Roe’s acknowledgement of the 
State’s strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.  Id. 
 156. 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1990) (holding that federal restrictions on the funding of abortions by 
states participating in the Medicaid program obligated under Title XIX of the Social Security Act 
to continue to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal funding was 
unavailable under the Hyde Amendment were constitutional, as these provisions meet the 
“rational relation to the state interest” standard).  See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 
533 (2001).  The Court, discussing Rust, held that a restriction prohibiting local recipients of 
Legal Services Corporation funds from engaging in representation to involving efforts to amend 
or challenge the validity of current welfare laws was an impermissible violation of First 
Amendment free speech.  Id. at 545.  The Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, interpreted Rust not 
as singling out abortion for suppression when denying funding for abortion counseling, but 
considered abortion as outside the scope of the project and therefore ineligible for funding.  Id. at 
540-41.  After Velazquez, state regulations imposing restrictions on funding of preconception sex 
and trait selection need to be carefully considered to avoid the statues being struck down later as 
violating free speech. 
 157. Harris, 448 U.S. at 315 (holding that a woman’s freedom of choice does not carry with it 
a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the protected resources). 
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support the view that the state should not commit any resources to facilitating 
abortions, even if it can turn a profit by doing so.158 
Persons seeking to realize the advantages of fundamental liberty interests 
are not entitled to government funding to take advantage of those rights.159  
Even if a legislative scheme is not adopted which will prohibit the use of 
reproductive technologies to select the sex or characteristics of one’s offspring 
prior to conception, funding schemes should not be implemented that would 
support the use of these reproductive technologies.  Government funding needs 
to be used for essential medical care and research, instead of being wasted on 
research, development, or utilization of preconception offspring selection. 
III.  HARMS ASSOCIATED WITH PRECONCEPTION SEX AND TRAIT SELECTION 
DEMAND REGULATION 
Where fundamental rights or interests are not implicated or infringed, 
courts review state statutes under a rational relations basis test, under which the 
statute withstands the due process challenge if the state identifies a legitimate 
state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the 
statute.160 
Congress has not yet decided where to draw the line around reproductive 
rights.  The policy reasons for protecting reproductive freedoms should not 
extend to the use of reproductive technologies to design the sex and 
characteristics of offspring.  While the right not to have a child has been 
established, no right has been established for parents to have children with 
certain characteristics.  This right, therefore, should not extend to the right to 
have a child with certain characteristics. 
Prebirth selection of offspring characteristics is not constitutional on the 
grounds that it bears a connection with the expected characteristics of the 
 
 158. Webster, 492 U.S. at 511.  See Maher, 432 U.S. at 464.  See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 519, 524-25 (1977) (holding that no constitutional violation exists if a state provides public 
funds for hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions). 
 159. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) (holding that regulations of the 
Department of Health and Human Services prohibiting recipients of funds under Title X of the 
Public Health Service Act from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and activities 
advocating abortion as a method of family planning do not violate a woman’s Fifth Amendment 
right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy); Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-18.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Rust elaborated that the government’s failure to fund abortions 
does not place an obstacle in the place of a woman seeking an abortion.  500 U.S. at 201-02.  
Instead, the lack of funding places the woman in the same place she would be in if the 
government decided not to fund family planning activities at all.  Id.  See also Maher, 432 U.S. at 
464 (holding that the state’s refusal to fund abortions does not violate Roe v. Wade). 
 160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Williamson v. 
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955)) (upholding an Oklahoma state regulation of 
visual care on the basis that an evil was present and the legislation was a rational way to correct 
the evil). 
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offspring, but may be constitutional based on the connection with the decision 
whether or not to reproduce.161  It is unconstitutional and unacceptable to 
decide whether or not to have a child based upon the child’s characteristics or 
sex.162  The law recognizes certain reproductive rights which are protected 
from interference, but preconception sex and trait selection are not within these 
rights. 
Since the use of preconception sex and trait selection technologies should 
not be considered a fundamental liberty right protected by constitutional 
guarantees of due process nor by constitutional guarantees of privacy, 
regulation in this area will only have to pass a “rational basis” test.  The 
potential harmful consequences of the use of this technology to the children 
themselves and society in general are sufficiently substantial to meet this 
criterion. 
New reproductive technologies present society with remarkable 
possibilities for manipulating practically every aspect of human 
reproduction.163  As a result, they disrupt deeply embedded expectations about 
the ordering of family relationships.164  Parents now have the option not only 
whether or not to have children and when to have them, but how to conceive 
them and even how to design them.165  Lawmakers should not fall under the 
illusion that changes in reproductive technologies can be accommodated within 
our familiar understandings of families.166  The potential harms implicated by 
parents’ use of reproductive technologies to select the sex and traits of their 
offspring justify regulation. 
A. Interests of the Potential Children Demand Regulation 
The potential harm to children justifies regulation over preconception sex 
and trait selection, whether courts use the strict scrutiny or the rational 
relations standard.  Interests of unborn children have also been recognized in 
certain situations.167  The state unquestionably has a “strong and legitimate 
 
 161. Robertson, supra note 6, at 425. 
 162. But see id. at 425-31.  Drawing the line between protected and unprotected traits and 
methods is likely to be difficult to draw.  Id. 
 163. Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New 
Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 501 (1997).  Contra Joseph Fletcher, THE 
ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING GENETIC ROULETTE 128 (1974) (discrediting the doubt 
as unobjective and without reasoning that the use of reproductive technology is disrespectful to 
human life if humans presume to be so arrogant as to exert control over the sources of life). 
 164. Dolgin, supra note 163, at 501. 
 165. Id. at 501-02. 
 166. Id. at  502 (suggesting that the use of reproductive technologies influences not only the 
way society views children, but also the way society views marriage and families in general). 
 167. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159, 162-63 (1973) (acknowledging a state’s interest in 
protecting the potential life of a fetus after viability).  In Roe, the Court stated that because a 
pregnant woman carries a potential human being she “cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . [Her] 
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interest in encouraging normal childbirth.”168  Children genetically altered and 
chosen by the parents’ whims cannot be considered children brought into the 
world through “normal childbirth.”  Further, the government has the power to 
secure the health of children against “impeding restraints and dangers.”169 
The potential psychological and biological affects on children produced by 
the use of sex selection technology may be devastating.170  For many parents, 
the birth of a child of the desired or unwanted sex (usually female) engenders 
happiness or unhappiness for the parents.171  Parents often hope their children 
will follow and exceed their own footsteps.  This can lead to extreme pressures 
on children to fulfill their parents’ dreams.  Children who know that they 
reflect the sex or characteristics that their parents choose may suffer from a 
damaging loss of self-esteem.172 
 
privacy is no longer sole and any right she possesses must be measured accordingly.”  Id.  A 
woman’s right of privacy in relation to an abortion is inherently different from marital intimacy, 
or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education.  Id.  The 
woman’s rights must be considered in lieu of the potential life growing inside the woman.  Id.  
While the Court explicitly denied any legal rights of the unborn child, the Court took the well-
being of this potential life into account during it’s deliberation.  Id. 
 168. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977) (recognizing the state’s interest in the unborn 
child throughout the woman’s pregnancy). 
 169. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (referring specifically to the evils of 
child labor).  The Court stated that a democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the health 
and well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.  Id.  It is well within the 
State’s police power to enact legislation to prevent these evils from corrupting children, who will 
be tomorrow’s citizens.  See id. at 168-69.  See also Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King’s County Hosp., 
278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (holding that the state is 
justified, over parents’ objections on religious grounds, to request court-ordered blood 
transfusions for children in need of the transfusions).  While parents are generally presumed to act 
in the best interests of their children, parents decisions do not always reflect the best interest of 
the child, thus requiring court interference.  Id.  The right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose child to ill health or death.  Id.  Parents are unlikely to realize the realm 
of harms that may result from their decision to select the sex or characteristics of one’s children.  
Once the decision is made, however, it is impossible for parents to stop the harmful 
consequences. 
 170. See Shanner & Niskee, supra note 150, at 1589-94 (indicating that the long-term psycho-
social implications of most assisted reproductive technologies remains incomplete). 
 171. Macnaughton, supra note 16, at 48 (discussing the reasons parents may use sex selection 
reproductive technologies).  See also Greg Swift, We Gave Up on Our Test Tube Baby, THE 
EXPRESS, Mar. 5, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 14336758 (telling the story of a couple who 
was outraged and disappointed when their efforts to obtain a female embryo failed, resulting in 
the pregnancy of a male child). 
 172. Mary Anne Warren, Reproductive Technology & Women, in THE ETHICS OF 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 239 (1992) (focusing on the damaging effects of sex pre-selection 
on females). 
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Parents who focus on having a “designer” child are not prepared for the 
unconditional love and acceptance essential for parenting.173  Parents with the 
attitude that their child may be designed to fit ideal specifications may be 
disappointed or feel guilty if their child does not live up to their expectations or 
if the child is born with a birth defect.174 
B. The Protection of Individuality Demands Regulation 
At the heart of the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.175  A person’s interest in defining 
one’s own destiny is violated if one’s parents are allowed to select the 
individual’s sex or characteristics.176 
It does not follow from Supreme Court decisions protecting contraception 
and child rearing decisions that prebirth control over offspring traits and 
characteristics follow those rights.177  Unlike abortion and contraception 
decisions which result in a child’s existence or non-existence, preconception 
selection is a method of exhibiting extreme control over a child’s destiny.  
Constitutionally protected upbringing decisions of parents do not broach this 
level of control over their children’s lives. 
Parents’ interests in the care and upbringing of their children is limited in 
some respects by the best interests of their children.178  Certain rights of 
 
 173. See Remaley, supra note 20, at 270.  Remaley is concerned that permitting parents to 
select “designer children” will sacrifice qualities inherent in the parent-child relationship.  Id.  By 
validating inappropriate notions of parenthood, the parent-child relationship will be harmed by 
parents’ expectations of the ideal child.  Id. at 270.  The child, while selected for certain traits, is 
set up for perfection, thus setting the child up for feelings of failure with any imperfection.  Id. 
 174. Id. (quoting the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research). 
 175. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 176. See Lagay, supra note 151 (citing D.S. King, Preimplanation Genetic Diagnosis and the 
“New” Eugenics, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 182 (1999)).  In a discussion of the potential 
application of preimplantation diagnosis to permit parents to select the traits of their children, 
Lagay expresses her concerns that the “chosen child” faces a determinism more forceful and rigid 
than genes.  Id.  The child faces parental determinism that the child fulfill the intention or talent 
or skills the child was selected to embody.  Id. 
 177. But see Robertson, supra note 6, at 427 (arguing that reproduction is a fundamental right 
and prebirth selection of offspring characteristics deserves the same protection).  While certain 
decisions have offered protection for the right not to have children and the right to have children, 
the issues and policies behind these decisions are not relevant to the right to have offspring with 
certain characteristics. 
 178. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky. 1992) (following Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923)) (holding that grandparent visitation statute did not violate fundamental rights of 
parents in consideration of the best interests of the child).  In King, the court stated: 
While the Constitution, as interpreted by various courts, does recognize the right to rear 
children without undue governmental interference, that right is not inviolate.  Parents are 
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unborn children are afforded protection.179  Protection of a woman’s right to 
have an abortion that is not medically necessary may be outweighed when the 
fetus is viable.180  Since a state may justify a statute restricting abortion as 
supporting the state’s interest in protection of embryonic and fetal life,181 this 
suggests that that government may, under certain circumstances, seek to 
protect children prior to their conception. 
Further, parental selection of children’s sex could jeopardize their 
children’s individuality.182  America’s emphasis on individuality is based 
partially on one’s unique genetic heritage.183  As a result, some view the 
manipulation of genetic structures as a threat to individual identity of future 
children.184  The use of genetic information prior to birth to shape an 
offspring’s characteristics contradicts American ethics dedication to the dignity 
and worth of each individual.185  This unprecedented exercise of control over 
the lives of one’s children is an unacceptable harm justifying government 
regulation.186 
 
required by law to see that their children are educated.  Children must be inoculated 
against disease.  Parents cannot abuse their children.  Severe restrictions are placed upon 
the employment of children.  Children must be restrained when riding in a motor vehicle.  
Thus, over the years, there has been increased legislation guaranteeing the safety, 
education, and the physical and emotional welfare of the children. 
Id. 
 179. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (noting that one of the dimensions of the protection of a 
woman’s right to have an abortion is the cruelness that may result to a child born to parents who 
do not want nor have the resources to care for the child). 
 180. Id. at 860. 
 181. See supra note 136.  See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 190-191 (1973); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 875.  The Supreme Court rejected the 
trimester framework it established in Roe because the practical effect of this framework was that 
it undervalued the State’s interest protecting the fetal life or potential life within the woman.  Id. 
Roe and Casey established the State’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life.”  Id. 
 182. Further, children created based upon their parent’s whims may lose their sense of being a 
“unique and intrinsically valuable entity.”  See also Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment 
and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 618, 
648 (1973). 
 183. Since similar traits are valued by the majority of persons, the use of sex and trait 
selection technologies may result in children who are quite similar to one another, thus reducing 
each individual’s unique qualities. 
 184. Priest, supra note 14, at 80-82.  See also Beth Foraker, Editorial, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 
2000, at 6, available at 2000 WL 6493534. 
 185. Robertson, supra note 6, at 422. 
 186. Id. at 423. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] ENDING PARENTS’ UNLIMITED POWER TO CHOOSE 551 
C. The Harms Associated with a Gender Imbalance in the Population 
Demands Regulation 
Another detrimental ramification of unrestricted use of reproductive 
technologies for preconception sex selection is the likelihood that a gender 
imbalance in the population will result.  The preference for male children 
persists in most parts of the world.187  In Asian countries where the birth of a 
male child is preferred over the birth of a female child, parents go to extreme 
measures to obtain a male child,188 and the gender balance in the population is 
evident.189  Studies suggest that if women in America were allowed to select 
the sex of their children, they would choose 161 boys for every 100 girls.190  
The historical quest for male offspring reflects the notions across societies that 
maleness is a form of social, political, and economic entitlement.191 
Proponents of this use of reproductive technology argue that couples who 
have one or more children of a certain sex may be interested in having a child 
of the other sex, so sex selection will be used in these cases to even out a sex 
imbalance in families.192  The technology will be an attractive option for 
couples in cultures where one sex carriers a higher status than the other sex.193  
 
 187. ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNING BABIES: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 166  (1999). 
 188. Mona Charen, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at A16 (addressing the infanticide of female 
children in these countries). 
 189. See id. (reporting that in India, infanticide and abortion of female fetuses resulted in a 
gender imbalance of 40 million more men than women).  See also Celia W. Dugger, Modern 
Asia’s Anomaly: The Girls Who Don’t Get Born, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2001, § 4 at 4 (commenting 
on the effect of sex-selective abortions in China and India, particularly that the ratio of girls to 
boys from birth to age six has dropped sharply in India).  In China, the one child per family 
policy has resulted in the infanticide of an estimated ten million to twenty million female babies.  
Id.  Ninety percent of the children in Chinese orphanages are female babies whose parents have 
abandoned the infant girls in hopes of obtaining a male baby.  Id. 
 190. Remaley, supra note 20, at 275-77.  Remaley indicates that parents are likely to select 
males as their firstborn children, thus denying females of benefits associated with being the 
firstborn child.  Id. 
 191. Danis, supra note 12 (noting the historical and cross-cultural efforts to ensure the birth of 
a male offspring).  See also EDWARD YOXEN, UNNATURAL SELECTION 137-73 (1986) 
(suggesting that sex selection will lead not to a significant sex imbalance in the population, but to 
a society of first-born males). 
 192. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OUR GENETIC FUTURE: THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF 
GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 197 (1992).  In 1990, Barroness Mary Warnock caused a furor when she 
expressed criticisms of sex selection based on the premise that this technique could be used to 
maintain class distinctions by allowing male heirs to continue family lines.  SUSAN MERRILL 
SQUIER, BABIES IN BOTTLES: TWENTIETH-CENTURY VISIONS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
100 (1994). 
 193. SQUIER, supra note 192, at 100. 
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The devastating consequences of a gender imbalance justifies law prohibiting 
the use of sex selection reproductive technologies.194 
D. The Violation of Women’s Rights Because Sex-Selection is Discriminatory 
Towards Women Demands Regulation. 
Sex selection should be prohibited because it potentially discriminates 
against women.195  The British Medical Association rejects permitting parents 
to use medical advances to select the sex of their children because it will 
increase sexual discrimination.196  At the very least, sex selection violates a 
principal of equality between females and males and the psychological 
importance to parenting of unconditional acceptance of a child.197  The 
discriminatory effect of selecting one sex over the other prior to conception is 
determintal to children’s self-esteem and well-being.  If the child born is not 
the desired sex, the child is likely to feel hurt and suffer from low self-esteem. 
E. Alteration of Natural Selection Resulting in a Loss of Genetic Diversity 
Demands Regulation. 
Human characteristics evolved over thousands, possibly even millions of 
years to result in the current range of traits, behaviors, and physical features 
currently evident in people world wide.198  Genetic alterations will lead to a 
loss of genetic diversity.199  Genetic diversity helps species survive the hazards 
 
 194. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING GENETIC 
ROULETTE 128 (1974).  For example, a gender imbalance will make it substantially more difficult 
for one sex to obtain mates.  See generally Helen Bequaert Holmes, Choosing Children’s Sex: 
Challenges to Feminist Ethics, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 148 (Joan C. Callahan 
ed., 1995) (applying feminist perspectives to oppose sex selection because it reflects the 
American patriarchal society in which maleness is equated with superiority and happiness).  
BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192 (condemning the abortion of fetuses based on 
their sex alone, but has yet to express an opinion on pre-conception sex-selection). 
 195. Macnaughton, supra note 16, at 48 (arguing that sex selection for social reasons should 
not be permitted because it is discriminatory and conflicts with societal ethical values).  See Greg 
Freeman, Mother Nature, Not Moms and Dads, Should Pick Child’s Gender, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2002, at C3.  Missouri State Representative Michael Reid’s felt that nature, not 
parents, should pick children’s sex.  Id.  Reid is concerned about discrimination against human 
embryos prior to transplantation, based on the embryo’s gender.  Id. 
 196. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 209. 
 197. See Morgan, supra note 41, at 74. 
 198. See generally 21 CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN 
RELATION TO SEX (Paul H. Barrett & Toby Linden eds., 1989). 
 199. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 156-57; Damewood, supra note 4 
(expressing concerns that the use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to select the sex or 
specific traits of one’s children could threaten innate human diversity).  Some legal scholars argue 
that when considering legislative prohibitions on reproductive technologies, concerns regarding 
decreasing the gene pools so that genetic diversity that is curtailed can easily be characterized as a 
legitimate state interest in public health—typically a compelling state interest.  See also June 
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of a changing environment, such as climate changes and pathogen 
resistance.200  This is especially important in an environment such as our own 
in which environmental and pathogenic conditions are constantly changing.  
When considering legislative prohibitions on reproductive technologies, 
concerns regarding decreasing the gene pools and curtailing genetic diversity 
can be characterized as a legitimate state interest in public health—typically a 
compelling state interest.201 
Sex and trait selection may be equated with a form of eugenics reflective 
of the practices represented in Nazi Germany or Huxley’s New World.202  This 
argument becomes particularly compelling in view of the “slippery slope” 
argument that if parents are allowed to select the sex of their children, parents 
will soon be permitted to select virtually every aspect of their offspring.203  By 
allowing parents to select the sex and other characteristics of their offspring, 
science is permitting parents to play a potentially dangerous role in genetic 
 
Coleman, Comment, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis of State Laws 
Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1346-48 (1996) (expressing grave 
concerns that parents might use the preconception sex selection process to select male children, 
which could ultimately lead to the extinction of humanity). 
 200. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 157 (indicating that species with 
diverse gene pools are more likely to overcome adverse circumstances because it is likely that 
some organisms which can overcome the unfavorable environment). 
 201. See Coleman, supra note 199, at 1346-48.  In an analysis of a variety of embryological 
research procedures, Coleman hesitates to adamantly oppose reproductive technologies based on 
this fear.  Id. 
 202. Danis, supra note 12, at 241 (indicating that a contrary view point is that “positive” 
eugenics should be distinguished from “negative” eugenics).  See Tabitha M. Powledge, Toward 
a Moral Policy for Sex Choice, in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN 201, 204-06 (Neil G. Bennett 
ed., 1983); Mark I. Evans et. al., Attitudes on the Ethics of Abortion, Sex Selection, and Selective 
Pregnancy Termination Among Health Care Professionals, Ethicists, and Clergy Likely to 
Encounter Such Situations, 164 AM. J. OBST. GYNECOL 1092, 1098 (1991); Plato, The Republic, 
in THE PORTABLE PLATO 469-73 (1986) (discussing the notion that if only those with the highest 
intellectual capacity and physical abilities in a society were permitted to reproduce, the preference 
would result in a superior society).  See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 
(1932); CHARLOTTE HALDANE, MAN’S WORLD (1927) (portraying a society organized around 
prenatal sex selection in which woman are reduced to biology, categorized by their reproductive 
and sexual roles, and ruled by a coterie of racist white male scientists through a network of 
cybernetic surveillance and biological controls).  While this argument may, at first glance, appear 
extreme when compared with the sterilization methods used by Hitler to further the goals of the 
“purification” of the Aryan race, notions of improving the human race through selective breeding 
has been supported by some since, at least, the time of Plato’s Republic and is continually met 
with fears that some will be excluded from the reproductive process. 
 203. Danis, supra note 12, at 241-42 (noting that because sex is analogous to these latter 
attribute genes, the advent of sex selection forbodes widespread genetic manipulation for the 
mere fulfillment of parents’ personal preferences).  See also David S. King, Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis and the “New” Eugenics, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 181 (1999) (worrying about 
“opening the human gene pool to the winds of social market forces,” that is transient, culturally 
influences concepts of the ideal or perfect person). 
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alteration.  Parents are likely to choose the traits which their culture deems 
preferable, but which may not necessarily be the most valuable to their child’s 
health or survival or to the continuation of human kind.204  Further, since the 
same sex (male) and characteristics (intelligence, kindness, athletic ability and 
physical attractiveness) are valued cross-culturally, long-term use of genetic 
selection may lead to a genetically homogenous environment, thus making 
humans more susceptible to diseases and environmental changes and other 
potential unknown consequences.  New genetic technologies need to be dealt 
with carefully because they could permanently and irreversibly alter the 
biology of life forms, the ecology, and natural evolution.205 
F.  If Preconception Sex and Trait Selection is Permitted, Children Will 
Suffer by Being Viewed as Commercial Products. 
Many people object to reducing children to consumer products, and 
doctors warn against using this invalidated medical technology for purely 
social reasons.206  Sex selection is objectionable on the moral and ethical 
principles that sex and characteristics such as hair color, intelligence, or 
athletic ability are not the proper criteria for choosing children.207  Parents need 
to value their children for the child’s sake and not for the child’s sex, and 
permitting parents to engineer their offspring will commodify children.208 
Modern reproductive technologies are a source of concern in our 
consumer-oriented society.209  Fears exist that parents will think of the child-
 
 204. But see Jones, supra note 4, at 202-07 (proposing that the use of trait selection 
technologies is itself an exhibition of inclusive fitness, thus permitting the “fittest” of the present 
world to reproduce). 
 205. See also MICHAEL W. FOX, BEYOND EVOLUTION 157 (1999) (discussing the potential 
harmful ramifications of unregulated genetic engineering technologies; noting that the upheaval 
of the natural selection process by the raising of genetically altered crops has a more devastating 
effect on wildlife than conventionally and organically raised crops). 
 206. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 197 (indicating that the use of 
science to allow parents to select children with particular traits, such as sex, physical, emotional, 
and intellectual attributes, is unacceptable). 
 207. See Maria Dolanska & Donald Evans, Patient Perceptions of Assisted Conception 
Services, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED 
PROCREATION (Donald Evans ed., 1996). 
 208. See Vicki G. Norton, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic 
Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1598-99 (1994) (discussing 
potential for abuse of nontherapeutic preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the ethical objections 
to the techniques).  Norton’s focus is on the prescreening of embryos for certain traits, but the 
most recent technology does not even necessitate the creation of an embryo to select a baby’s sex. 
 209. GOSDEN, supra note 30, at 232  (discussing the damaging effects of commodification to 
children created through the use of reproductive technologies, specifically  when parents purchase 
celebrity sperm and eggs at overpriced rates to produce “designer” children).  See Doe v. Att’y 
Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).  In Doe, the court upheld a Michigan statute that 
outlawed paid surrogacy.  Id. at 488.  The court conceded that the statute encroached upon the 
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to-be as more of a fashion object—the designer baby—than a unique human 
being with it’s own needs.  Parents who are disappointed because sex selection 
techniques failed for them may take their disappointment out on their child.210 
In the line of cases recognizing parental decision making rights at the 
expense of the rights of potential offspring, the interests of potential children 
do not risk degraded children in the same manner inherently involved with 
preconception sex and trait selection.  Concepts of children seem to be based 
on the notion that children are the property of their parents.211  Children 
produced pursuant to their parents’ genetic specifications might enjoy high 
social status as a result of these characteristics.212  As these children become 
highly valued, children who are not genetically altered will become 
undervalued.213 
 
constitutionally protected zone of privacy, which guarantees “freedom from government 
interference in matters of marriage, family, procreation, and intimate associations.”  Id. at 487.  
The court concluded that given the state’s compelling interests to warrant intrusion into the area 
of procreation generally protected by privacy, the statute should be upheld.  Id. at 487-88.  The 
court found a compelling state interest in protecting the best interests of the children by 
preventing them from becoming commodities and precluding the exploitation of women.  Id. at 
486-87. 
 210. GOSDEN, supra note 31, at 175.  See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Surrogacy Legislation in 
California: Legislative Regulation of Surrogacy and Reproductive Technology, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 
613, 617-18 (1994).  According to Shultz, money is a proxy for other questions and 
consequences–the allocation of power and agency, the appropriateness of bargaining and 
enforcement models in family life, and the fear of treating persons as objects.  Id. at 618.  People 
of color as well as economically powerless individuals often find themselves being abused with 
the justification that this abuse is based on “the market.”  See id.  The commodification and 
commercialization of intimate life is a core concern.  FOX, supra note 204, at 211-18 (lamenting 
about the greed present in humans today and the lack of reverence for nature).  Fox suggests that 
humans now aim to control and manipulate life around them, while lacking wisdom and ethical 
responsibility.  Id.  Human beings are playing God.  Id. 
 211. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on 
Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1810 (1993) (arguing that children are seen as 
private, not public property, which are subject to their parent’s successes and weaknesses). 
 212. Danis, supra note 12, at 236.  The high cost of eugenic procedures might result in a 
lower class of genetically “imperfect” persons.  Id. at 236-37.  The advent of sex selection 
forbodes widespread genetic manipulation of the fulfillment of mere preference.  Id.  Women are 
likely to suffer as a result of being the less selected sex.  Id.  Parents would select male children 
more often than female children, and they would select male children to be first born offspring 
(thus permitting males to benefit from the advantages of being first born children).  Id.  Males, 
through their greater numbers, would know that they were selected more often and were thus 
more desired, increasing their sense of self-worth and self-importance while diminishing the self-
esteem of their younger sisters or other women.  Id. 
 213. Danis, supra note 12, at 242 (indicating that children created through these reproductive 
mechanisms may experience a loss of “selfhood” and they realize that they are genetically 
fabricated to another’s design).  See also Coleman, supra note 199, at 1351 (arguing that abuse of 
reproductive technologies could include discrimination against those not genetically engineered 
and those who do not get to select the preferred traits).  Shultz, supra note 210, at 618 (addresses 
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G. Existing Laws in the United States Do Not Apply to the Use of Sex and 
Trait Selection Technologies. 
No federal or state laws exist in the United States regulating the use of 
preconception sex and trait selection techniques.214  Current laws that prohibit 
research or experimentation on embryos are the closest potential sources of 
regulation, but they fail to extend to preconception sex and trait selection.215  A 
few states have laws prohibiting the use of abortion to selection the sex of 
one’s offspring; similar legislation has been proposed at the federal level.216  
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Executive Summary, June 
1997) called for a continuation of moratorium on any federal funding for 
research involving human cloning and a call for all private individuals and 
institutions to comply with this moratorium on human cloning.217 
Even if no laws are enacted prohibiting the use of reproductive 
technologies to select the sex and characteristics of one’s offspring, funding 
should not be provided to support these decisions.  The Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution generally confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, 
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property 
interests of which the government may not deprive the individual.218  The 
government is under no obligation to provide funding in support of the 
advantages conferred by those rights which are protected as fundamental 
liberty interests.219 
 
the exploitation of persons from a lower socioeconomic background, certain ethnic groups, and 
women). 
 214. See Lopez, supra note 16, at 173 (noting that the only use of reproductive technology 
which is regulated is the use of articifical insemination and surrogate motherhood).  The 
legislature failed to enact legislation regulating other areas of reproductive technology to any 
significant degree since that time. 
 215. Norton, supra note 208, at 1615-19 (considering federal regulations on fetal 
experimentation and state laws prohibiting fetal research). 
 216. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(8) (2002) (prohibiting any person from 
intentionally performing an abortion when the person has knowledge that the pregnant woman is 
seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus); Civil Rights of Infants Act, S. 76, 
107th Cong. § 2(b) (2001) (making it a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States to perform an abortion with the knowledge that the abortion is being 
performed solely because of the gender of the fetus). 
 217. LISA YOUNT, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 269-270 (2000) (noting 
that bans on the use of reproductive technologies are often included with laws regulating human 
cloning). 
 218. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 491-92 (1989).  The government has no 
constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is constitutionally 
protected and may validly choose to fund one activity over another based upon the state’s 
preferences.  See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980). 
 219. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-194 (1991); Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-318. 
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H. Law Existing in Other Countries 
Current legislation in other countries is aimed at restricting abortions for 
the use of fetus sex selection.  In India, where fetuses are often aborted because 
they are female, the use of amniocentesis is limited to screen for potential 
medical abnormalities.220 
In Canada, laws prohibiting the gender selection of children for non-
medical purposes were introduced on May 3, 2001, and are currently under 
consideration.221  Europeans express outrage at the concept of selecting the sex 
or characteristics of one’s children for non-medical reasons.222  However, this 
 
 220. Radhika Balakrishnan, The Social Context of Sex Selection and the Politics of Abortion 
in India, in POWER AND DECISION: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF REPRODUCTION, 278 (Gita Sen & 
Rachel C. Snow eds., 1994).  The author urges the enactment of legislation to remain current with 
advancing technologies which will permit the use of pre-birth sex selection in other ways.  The 
expansion of medical technologies permitting sex selection may be more difficult to regulate. 
 221. See Canada Proposes Reproduction Laws, TIMES UNION (Albany), May 6, 2001, at A6, 
available at 2001 WL 6305119.  The committee of health of the House of Commons is studying 
the legislation, with a report on the draft law anticipated in January 2002.  See also Danis, supra 
note 12, at 261 (noting that the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
has recommended a ban on all sex selection except where medically indicated for sex-linked 
diseases). 
 222. See They’re Opening Pandora’s Box to Designer Babies Modern Dilemma: Tragic 
Couple’s Bid for Baby Girl Unethical, Says Professor, BIRMINGHAM POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at 9 
(reporting the concern of a medical law and ethics professor in Scotland who is concerned that 
Europeans will use European Convention of Human Rights legislation to gain permission for 
gender diagnosis for non-medical reasons); GOSDEN, supra note 30, at 173.  See also Deryck 
Beyleveld & Shaun Pattison, Legal Regulation of Assisted Procreation, Genetic Diagnosis and 
Gene Therapy, in THE ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 215, 241 (Hille Haker & 
Deryck Beyleveld eds., 2000) (advising that the United Kingdom licensing authority advised 
reproductive clinics and sex selection for social reasons is unacceptable).  The UK licensing 
authority advises the clinics that it licenses that sex selection for social reasons is unacceptable.  
Jurgen Simon, Comment on Legal Regulation of Assisted Procreation, Genetic Diagnosis and 
Gene Therapy, in THE ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 289 (Hille Haker & 
Deryck Beyleveld eds., 2000).  Portugal and Italy were considering legislation in this area in 2000 
(noting that the resolution of the European Parliament from March 1997 condemns the use of pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis, judging it to be a violation of human dignity that should not be 
accepted by any society).  Sandra Dick, Be It Boy or Girl, Let’s Choose Life, EVENING NEWS 
(Scotland), July 9, 2001, at 11, available at 2001 WL 24048983 (reporting that Scottish secretary 
Dr. Bill O’Neill is full of condemnation of a clinic opening in Glasgow which will allow would-
be parents to choose the sex of their baby).  The article addresses the “slippery slope” argument 
that the selection of sex will lead to the selection of characteristics such as hair color, intelligence, 
and the shape of the baby’s fingernails.  Id.  Technology is available for patients utilizing IVF 
treatment to choose the sex of embryos, although in the United Kingdom sex selection is 
permitted only where a genetic disease is carried with the male sex.  Id.  Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia, 
Assisted Reproduction in Greece, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND PRACTICE OF 
ASSISTED PROCREATION 285 (Donald Evans ed., 1996).  Similarly, in Greece, sex selection is 
prohibited except to prevent serious sex-linked hereditary disease.  Id. at 285.  However, no state 
legislation exists, so reproductive technologies may be used in the private sector to select sex.  Id.  
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contempt for the use of reproductive technologies for arbitrary reasons is 
unregulated in many European countries with the laws governing 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis varying to a large degree.223  The large 
variation of restrictions imposed by foreign legislation on assisted reproduction 
suggests that foreign governments struggle to find a place within current 
regulation of conception, abortion, and family law under which assisted 
reproduction should fall.224  It is likely that legislators in the United States will 
face similar difficulties in finding a firm basis for laws regulating 
preconception sex and trait selection technologies under the present regulation 
scheme. 
I. The Need for Legislation 
It is now time to face the legal, ethical, and policy issues rising from 
parents’ ability to select or shape the characteristics of their offspring and the 
potential of government regulation in this area.225  The need for legislation is 
apparent as the accuracy and availability of preconception selection technology 
becomes available.226  Because the decision to select the sex and characteristics 
of one’s offspring does not fall into one of the well-established constitutional 
law areas, courts may flounder at reaching consistent decisions. 
A statute regulating the use of nontherapeutic preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis must carefully define the term “nontherapeutic” in order to withstand 
a challenge for unconstitutional vagueness.227  Because this type of arbitrary 
 
Further, the proposed French Bioethics Law attempts to maintain the “dignity of the individual” 
by prohibiting any research which threatens the integrity of humans.  Id. at 285-86.  While no 
government statement related this to preconception sex selection, choosing a child based upon 
arbitrary reasons such as sex and characteristics inherently undermines the child’s worth. 
 223. Beyleveld & Pattison, supra note 222, at 238-49 (dividing the laws into the following 
groups: legislation permitting preimplantation genetic diagnosis—Denmark, France, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Countries with legislation prohibiting pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis; countries without legislation permitting pre-implantation genetic diagnosis by 
default—Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain; countries without legislation 
prohibiting pre-implantation genetic diagnosis by default—France, Ireland, and Luxembourg).  
Where laws do exist in the area of assisted procreation and genetic diagnosis, it typically prohibits 
reproductive cloning and germ-line therapy, either prohibits non-therapeutic embryo research or 
subjects it to conditions, permits abortion and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and regulates 
those assisted reproductive techniques that involve the storage or use or embryos outside the 
body. 
 224. Id. at 216-21 (varying from no restrictions to no access to these services).  Many 
European countries limit the use of assisted reproduction based on criteria such as marital status, 
sexual orientation, years of cohabitation, age of female, the absence of children, and health 
reasons.  Id. at 224. 
 225. Robertson, supra note 6, at 423. 
 226. Danis, supra note 12, at 222 (proposing a complete ban on sex selection). 
 227. See Norton, supra note 208, at 1616 (discussing a less advanced reproductive technology 
to select offspring traits, but which implicates the same issues). 
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“ordering” of child characteristics does not fall under individuals’ procreative 
liberty interests of rights of privacy, no constitutional rights are jeopardized by 
regulation in this area. 
Instead of leaving the judiciary to struggle to find a place for 
preconception sex and characteristic selection, regulation must be enacted to 
deal with these issues.  States should have the power to regulate any form of 
genetic manipulation of the reproductive process to the extent necessary to 
protect autonomy, to prevent private gender discrimination, to prevent skewing 
of the gender and genetic pool and to prevent any one person or entity from 
controlling and upsetting the genetic development of future generations.228  
Given the extensive harms which may result from the utilization of 
preconception sex and characteristic selection, regulation in this area meets the 
rationale state interest standard necessary to uphold state regulation where a 
liberty interest is not at stake. 
The United States lags behind technological advances in developing a clear 
social policy regulating the use of technology to select the sex of one’s 
offspring.229  Some argue that legislation should be enacted to regulate the use 
of procreative technologies so scarce medical resources will be given priority 
over these procreative technologies.230  A complete ban on all types of pre-
implantation sex selection technology is advocated by some as not being 
contrary to constitutional rights.231  Others call, not for a complete ban of 
preconception sex selection, but for moderate measures to identify and prevent 
any serious harm as selective reproductive technology develops.232  Even those 
persons who contend that parental use of trait selection technologies should be 
 
 228. See Lopez, supra note 16 (considering whether the use of sex selection technology 
implicates individual autonomy so strongly as to be deemed fundamental and emphasizing that 
the courts should seek solutions that maximizes autonomy and concurrently prevents harm to 
others.). 
 229. Danis, supra note 12, at 263.  Considering the swift pace of evolution in this field, sex 
selection is already an established technology and is thus likely to become entrenched in medical 
practice and social consciousness unless an immediate response follows. 
 230. See Donald Evans, Creating the Child, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW, 
AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 8 (Donald Evans ed., 1996). 
 231. Danis, supra note 12, at 245 (concluding that a ban on most types of pre-implantation 
sex selection technology is safely within constitutional bounds, but noting that some may argue 
that an individual’s choice to use alternative reproductive technology, including sex selection 
technology, is an exercise or personal liberty). 
 232. Remaley, supra note 20, at 297-98.  These moderate steps would prevent serious harm.  
Id.  Other measures include requiring couples to donate their left-over sperm or embryos, while 
could be used for infertile couples.  Id.  Remaley advocates enacting measures now to detect and 
evaluate the use and effects of preconception sex selection (and trait selection) so as to avoid 
delay if it becomes apparent that a prohibition is necessary.  Id. at 292-98.  One measure that is 
ripe for implementation is to create a waiting list for parents who want to use these reproductive 
technologies.  Id. at 292. 
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afforded the same Constitutional protection as other matters of family, 
parenting, and procreation agree that some limitations must apply.233 
One proposed solution is to enact legislation ensuring a sex balance in the 
population, but this solution fails to address the other harms created by 
preconception sex and trait selection, such as discrimination against women, 
social and psychological consequences for offspring, and deterrent affects on 
the parent-child relationship.234  This type of legislation is insufficient to deter 
the potential harms implicit in preconception sex and trait selection.235  
Legislation is necessary to prohibit preconception sex and trait selection before 
the harms involved are beyond control.  Trait and sex selection of children’s 
characteristics should not be protected as fundamental rights.  The use of these 
reproductive technologies suggest a realm of rights not yet addressed by the 
court, but involving different concerns, issues, rights, and harms that previous 
family and reproductive decisions have not addressed. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Current legislation does not place any obstacles in the path of parents who 
want to choose the sex and traits of their offspring prior to conception.  
Previous Supreme Court decisions protecting decisions related to family and 
conception do not incorporate these preconception decisions.  The harms 
associated with sex and trait selection are dissimilar from the harms involved 
in these previous cases.  Preconception sex and trait selection pose detrimental 
consequences both to the children produced with the use of these reproductive 
technologies, other children in their families, and others in society.  Seminal 
Supreme Court decisions deal with parents rights to choose measures related to 
the care, education, and upbringing of their children, and the rights of women 
and men to choose whether or not to have a child.  The rights associated with 
these prior decisions does not extend to permit parents to choose the sex and 
traits of their offspring prior to conception.  It is imperative that legislators 
draft regulations to prohibit the use of sex and trait selection for arbitrary 
reasons. 
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 233. See Jones, supra note 4, at 189 (arguing that trait selection technologies should be 
permitted to select for any trait using any method unless it is clearly and significantly damaging 
to the future child). 
 234. Remaley, supra note 20, at 292-93. 
 235. Id. at 293.  Further, the difficulties inherent in enforcing a sex balance make this 
proposition undesirable. 
 236. J.D. candidate, Saint Louis University, May 2003.  I would like to thank my parents, Lee 
and Joan Plummer, and my grandparents, John and Dorothy Kleinschnittger, for their support and 
encouragement. 
